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SIMONE M. SEPE*

Directors' Duty to Creditors and the Debt
Contract

ABSTRACT

Under the current model of corporate fiduciary law, informational asymmetry between managers and creditors makes the debt contract inadequate to efficiently
govern the debtor-creditor relationship. More specifically, as currently devised, the
debt contract fails to prevent managerial opportunism, that is, the managers' tendency to increase the investment's risk ex post. Anticipating this contract's failure,
creditors ask for higher interest rates. Moreover, because of the scarcity of credible
information, they tend to pool firms in general risk categories and price debt on
the basis of the average risk increase pursued within each category. As a result,
social costs arise and credit capital is inefficiently allocated.
A governance model providing for a permissive regime of directors' duty to creditors and a rule of textualist interpretation of the debt contract are the legal tools I
propose to attempt to redress the existing contractual inefficiency. By sanctioning
directors with personal liability for increasing the level of risk contractually accepted by creditors, the proposed duty would serve: (i) as a bonding mechanism to
induce directors to fulfill the contract and refrain from managerial opportunism;
and (ii) to make the debt contract a credible signal on corporate risk. Paired to the
duty's existence, the adoption of a textualist interpretative rule, which mandates to
consider accepted by creditors any risk they have not contractually excluded or
limited, would (i) give both parties the right incentives to write more state-contingent contracts; and (ii) reduce'uncertainty in legal relationships by ruling out the
possibility of ex post completion of the contract (and of the duty itself) by the third
adjudicator. Ultimately, the model I propose aims at achieving a two-fold purpose.
On the one hand, it attempts to make the credit market better able to price debt on
the basis of firms' specific risks, i.e., to move the market from the existing pooling
equilibrium to separating equilibria. On the other, it aims at enabling parties to
contract so as to maximize the ex ante value of their exchanges.
J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School. E-mail: simone.sepeCyale.edu. I owe special thanks to Professors
Alan Schwartz and Henry Hansmann for helpful discussion and comments at various stages in this essay's
evolution. In addition, I have greatly benefited from the comments of Professors Jonathan Macey and Frank
Partnoy. Finally, I am immensely grateful to my wife Saura, for her continuous support throughout this
project. Of course, any mistakes are mine only.
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INTRODUCTION
BOTH COURTS AND SCHOLARS HAVE LONG INTERPRETED THE

directors' duty to pur-

sue the interest of the corporation as an exclusive obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. This view of corporate fiduciary law is commonly referred to as the
shareholder primacy rule.' Thus, a fiduciary duty of directors to creditors has been
traditionally denied in American corporate law2 but for one exception: the insolvent corporation.' In this special circumstance, creditors would take the place of
shareholders as the parties with an equitable interest in the corporate assets, and
this would justify the shift of fiduciary duties in their favor.' In the past twenty
years, however, the shareholder primacy rule has undergone mounting criticism.
Largely beginning with the concerns caused by the takeover explosion of the
1980s, legal scholars have widely discussed whether directors also should pursue

1. The landmark decision on the shareholder primacy rule is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919), in which the court expressly established that: "[a] business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders." More recent judicial opinions reinforcing the legacy of the
shareholder primacy rule include, among others, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & ForbesHoldings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986) and Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). As to the scholarly
contributions on the matter, see, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) ("The efficiency goal of maximizing the company's value to investors
[is] ... the principal function of corporate law."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993) ("Shareholder
wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.");
Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholdersand CorporateLaw: Communitarians and
Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 398 (1993) ("It has been the dominant American conception of the
corporation for many years that a corporation's primary goal is, and should be, the maximization of shareholder welfare."); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 1. CORP. L. 277, 280 (1998) ("The
shareholder primacy norm is considered fundamental to corporate law."); Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors'Duties
to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the FinanciallyDistressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1214 (2003)
("The shareholder maximization norm is the dominant theoretical approach to directorial duties .... "). In
addition, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman note that "the ... dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law" is not limited to the American experience, but is the rule "in key commercial jurisdictions." Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001).
2. The decisions on the matter are copious. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (affirming that the rights of corporate debtholders are limited to those
arising from the contract governing debtor-creditor relationships); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04
(Del. 1988) (stating that creditors of solvent corporations are not entitled to directorial fiduciary duties because
they do not hold any existing property right or equitable interest which supports the imposition of such
duties); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219-20 (Del. Ch. 1974) (dismissing bondholders' derivative cause of
action which alleged breach of directors' fiduciaries duties on the ground that such duties do not exist).
3. Historically, the insolvency exception finds its origin in the so-called trust fund doctrine, under which
directors' duties shifted to creditors upon the company's dissolution or the commencement of insolvency proceedings. See, e.g., Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). Courts, however,
gradually started to recognize the mere insolvency of the company as the triggering condition of the duties'
shift. See, e.g., Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944). See infra Part ll.A.l.
4. Managers' fiduciary duty to shareholders is composed of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Thus,
the discourse on the extension of managers' accountability to other corporate constituencies has alternatively
referred to the duty or duties of directors. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v.
Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 971 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2003), a)Td, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
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the interests of other corporate constituencies, in particular that of company
creditors.5
In this essay, I argue that the problem of directors' duty to creditors is basically a
problem of contractual efficiency. Under the current paradigm of corporate fiduciary law, the debt contract fails to govern the debtor-creditor relationship pursuant
to a welfare maximization criterion.6 This not only increases the cost of corporate
borrowing, but also results in an inefficient allocation of credit capital. The main
object of this work is thus to explore the legal tools that may help to enhance the
debt contract's efficiency. To this end, I propose adoption of a corporate governance model providing for a permissive regime of directors' duty to creditors and a
textualist interpretation of the debt contract.7
My basic claim is that in a corporate governance system dominated by the shareholder primacy rule and in which managers' compensation is often equity-based,
informational asymmetry' between managers and creditors makes the debt contract inadequate to prevent managerial opportunism.9 Being held to the exclusive
maximization of share value and often holding themselves an equity interest, managers have weak incentives to disclose their private information to creditors. As a
result, it is very difficult for creditors to negotiate contractual provisions that are

5. See infra Part I.A.
6. 1 share the idea that "the state should choose the rules that regulate commercial transactions according
to the criterion of welfare maximization." Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
ContractLaw, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003). Under this view, social welfare would be measured by the number
of contracts that maximize ex ante the gains of contracting parties.
7. The textualist approach to contract interpretation is so termed because it confines the action of the
interpreter basically to the sole text of the contract. This approach is also termed "classical' or "Willistonian" as
it was dominant in contract interpretation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and is often
associated with the views of Professor Samuel Williston. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 95, at 349-50 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) ("The court will give [written contract]
language its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will not even admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning to be."). In contrast to the textualist approach, the
contextualist approach to contract interpretation challenges the idea that express terms always represent the
best evidence of the parties' agreements, at least without an examination of the context of that agreement.
Arthur Corbin and Karl Llewellyn are among the most distinguished representatives of the contextualist approach. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161,
161-70 (1965) (observing that written words are intrinsically ambiguous); K. N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in
Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1243-44 (1938).
8. Informational asymmetry refers to the situation in which one party has more or better information
than the other. This creates a power imbalance which may lead to a market breakdown. The term was introduced by George Akerlof in his seminal 1970 work The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism. See George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the MarketMechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).
9. This is the tendency of managers, acting as shareholders' fiduciaries, to increase the investment's level
of risk as the company incurs indebtedness (what in finance theory is referred to as asset substitution). See infra
Part I.B.2.b. Asset substitution, however, is not the only form of managerial opportunism. The other two are
claim dilution and dividend policy. Yet, I maintain that the debt contract is effective in governing the latter two
forms of managerial opportunism, but fails to restrain the first one. See infra id. For this reason, whereas it is
not differently specified, hereinafter, the term managerial opportunim indicates exclusively the managers' tendency to engage in asset substitution.
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effective in restraining managerial opportunism. In fact, under the present fiduciary law paradigm, managers might well be induced to conceal information to borrow at a lower cost and reserve a costless option to invest in riskier projects.
Furthermore, even when managers disclose information to creditors, the latter tend
to be reluctant to consider it credible, because they expect managers to act in the
exclusive interest of shareholders.
The credit agreement's failure to deter managerial opportunism, however, is not
a problem of a distributive nature, but rather allocative. Anticipating this failure,
creditors charge higher interest rates. In addition, because of the lack of credibile
information on the risk underlying corporate assets, creditors are unable to distinguish between good firms (i.e., firms that do not engage in asset substitution) and
bad firms (i.e., firms that engage in asset substitution). Thus, they pool firms in
risk categories and price debt on the basis of the average risk increase pursued
within that category. Consequently, problems of cross-subsidization and adverse
selection arise," and credit capital is inefficiently allocated.
A default rule of law, imposing on directors a duty not to unilaterally increase
the risk accepted by creditors in the debt contract (hereinafter, creditors' accepted
risk or CAR), is the first legal instrument that I propose for attempting to redress
the current inefficiency of the debt contract. The basic assumption underlying the
existence of the proposed duty is that if directors want to reserve an option to
increase the investment's risk ex post, they must pay for it. This requires that they
disclose information on the investment's underlying risk so that creditors can price
that option. Under this view, the duty to creditors, sanctioning directors with personal liability for failing to respect the contract provisions on the CAR, would have
two functions. First, it would serve as a bonding mechanism" giving directors incentives to stay in the contract and not to exercise options they have not bought.
Second, it would make creditors more inclined to rely on the information disclosed
by managers. In other terms, the duty would transform the contract into a credible
signal on corporate risk. 2 As a result, creditors would become able to price debt on
10. Cross-subsidization is the phenomenon occurring when one group pays a relatively high price and
thus enables another group to pay a relatively low price. Applied to lending relationships, cross-subsidization
takes place when good firms are forced by the suspicion of low-quality borrowing to pay higher interest rates
than they would if the presence of bad firms was excluded. Adverse selection, instead, refers to a market process
in which bad results occur due to information asymmetries between contracting parties so that bad products or
customers are more likely to be selected. Applied to lending relationships, this means that bad firms are most
likely to receive financing because they are more willing than good firms to bear the average increase of the cost
of debt determined by the pooling equilibrium. See infra Part I.B.2.e.
11. A bonding mechanism guarantees one party (i.e., the principal) from the misbehavior of the other
(i.e., the agent) by imposing penalties on the latter for shortfall in her performance. Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 I. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
12. In finance theory, a credible signal is one that, in a situation characterized by informational asymmetry, provides accurate information and can distinguish among senders, i.e., among firms characterized by a
different corporate risk. The concept of signalling was first studied by Michael Spence, who proposed to consider going to college as a credible signal for an employer who wants to hire an employee skilled in learning.
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the basis of the debt's contract information and provisions, rather than by pooling
firms in general risk categories. Economically, assuming competitive markets, 3 the
duty would ultimately induce the credit market to move from a pooling equilibrium to separating equilibria, in which debt is priced on the basis of the firm's
marginal risk.
The second legal tool that I propose to enhance contractual efficiency is a textualist interpretative rule mandating that courts consider creditors to have accepted
any risk that they have not contractually excluded or limited. The adoption of such
a rule would also have a two-fold purpose. First, it would induce both parties to
write more state-contingent debt contracts. 4 Second, it would eliminate the possibility of ex post completion of the contract and, therefore, of the duty (which is
therein determined) by the third adjudicator. This, in turn, would reduce uncertainty in legal relationships.
Because creditors' payoffs in pooling and separating equilibria are economically
the same," if we relax the competitive market assumption, the duty to creditors by
itself might be a weak instrument to change the current mechanism of debt pricing.
A textualist interpretative rule would thus be necessary to give also to creditors the
right incentives to specify the contract. More specifically, I claim that the adoption
of such a rule, together with the duty's existence, would prompt Nash bargaining 6

Indeed, assuming that people skilled in learning can do better at college than those who are unskilled, attending college becomes a signal people can use to distinguish themselves in front of perspective employers. See
Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signaling, 83 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973). See generally BERNARD SALANIt, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT 99-118 (2005); PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 99125 (2004).
13. This is a crucial assumption. Perfect competitive markets are those in which "no individual or firm
exercises monopoly power . . . and each participant acts as if demand were infinitely elastic at the quoted
prices." Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-SignallingApproach, 8 BELL J.
ECON. 23, 25 (1977).
14. By state-contingent contracts, I mean contracts that specify in detail the parties' obligations depending
on the possible contingencies that may take place. Contracts are low-state contingent, instead, when they tend
to provide for a low number of possible contingencies. Similarly, a low state-contingent covenant is one that
provides for few future states of the world as opposed to a highly state-contingent one. See Alan Schwartz,
Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277-78 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998); Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Magli, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Cost of Writing Contracts, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 798, 799 (2002). Cf also Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 108, 122 (2000).
15. See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY (1995); Jeffrey S. Banks & Joel Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, 55 ECONOMETRICA 647
(1987); Charles Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection, 11 BELL I. ECON. 108
(1980); A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED
SCREENING PROCESSES (1974); Akerlof, supra note 8.
16. Simply put, a Nash bargaining solution (or equilibrium) corresponds to the solution at which players
make equal proportional sacrifices. In other words, it is that in which no single player, by changing her strategy, can obtain higher utility if the other players stick to their parts. In addition, the Nash solution satisfies a
number of conditions that are appealing in their own right. Such a solution is, indeed, efficient (Pareto optimal), individually rational and (of course) feasible. See John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games,
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 36, 48-49 (1950); John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS MATHEMATICS
286 (1951).
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between directors and creditors which would ultimately lead to an optimal level of
specification of the debt contract. On the one hand, bearing any unspecified risk,
creditors would have incentives to specify the risk they accept. On the other, directors would be induced to disclose more information to avoid general covenants,
which would tend to exclude a large set of investment options and, therefore,
broaden the area of their liability.
The adoption of a textualist interpretative rule, however, would serve also a second function. It would eliminate the risk of value-decreasing judicial errors in the
enforcement of the debt contract. The basic assumption here is that because parties
have more and better information on the substantive terms of their exchange, they
are in the best position to devise the most efficient allocation of their rights and
duties. The contractual determination of the duty to creditors makes no exception
to this assumption. In fact, by leading to a re-determination of the duty's scope by
the third adjudicator, any contractual interpretation not conforming to the letter of
the parties' agreement would risk reducing the expected value of the parties' exchange. Also for this reason, a textualist interpretative regime should be preferred
over a contextualist one."7
In Part I of this essay, I first offer a critical assessment of the dominant academic
views of directors' duty to creditors and then illustrate why the debt contract is
unable to govern the parties' relationship pursuant to a welfare maximization criterion. In particular, I explain why the organizational paradigm based on the shareholder primacy rule and managerial equity compensation schemes makes the debt
contract inadequate to govern the investment's underlying risk. I also explain how
such inadequacy leads to an inefficient allocation of credit capital. In Part II, I
discuss the positive elaboration of the duty to creditors as reproduced in the two
8
most relevant judicial decisions on the matter, namely the CreditLyonnais"
and the
Production Resources 9 opinions. In the discussion on Credit Lyonnais, I explain why
the insolvency exception is an incomplete doctrine of directors' duty to creditors
and why the net present value test devised by the Credit Lyonnais court is an inefficient test of directors' liability. I then offer some preliminary comments on the
Production Resources opinion, focusing, in particular, on the formulation of good
faith elaborated by the court.2" In Part III, I expound my proposed new model of
corporate fiduciary law. First, I describe the functions of the proposed duty to

17. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 572-75 (arguing that textualist interpretation maximizes the ex
ante value of contractual relationships). See also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis
of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 277, 280 (1992) (noting that, because of
the non-verifiability of parties' information, courts are not able to enforce value- maximizing terms and,
thereby, suggesting that a textualist approach to contract interpretation would be more efficient).
18. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., CIV. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155-56 n.55 (1991) [hereinafter Credit Lyonnais].
19. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004).
20. Id. at 786-91.
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creditors and clarify why a default rule of law, rather than the private contracting of
the parties, is desirable to establish the duty. Second, I illustrate the proposed rule
of textualist interpretation of the debt contract. I explain that such a rule would
serve two basic purposes. On the one hand, it would prompt Nash bargaining between the parties leading to the optimal specification of debt contracts. On the
other, it would also reduce uncertainty in legal relationships by banning subjective
interpretations of the debt contract (and of the duty to creditors). Third, I set out
the several options that the proposed model would offer to the company's directors
for escaping liability. I also discuss why this set of exemptions would not impair the
system of incentives provided by the model to induce directors to disclose more
and credible information. Fourth, I illustrate how this model should work in practice and offer a basic taxonomy on the contractual determination of the duty to
creditors. I then attempt to suggest a conceptualization of the duty based on the
good faith fiduciary paradigm as recently elaborated in the Production Resources
and the more recent Disney opinion.2 Fifth, I explain why only creditors that are
capital providers should benefit from the proposed duty. Sixth, I make some policy
considerations as to the effect of directors' liability insurance over the contractual
determination of the duty to creditors and the firm's capital structure.
I.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE ON DIRECTORS'
FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO CREDITORS

A.

The Rather Different Views of Contractariansand Communitarians

Fiduciary obligation has been defined as "one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law."22 This seems especially true in the case of corporate fiduciary
law. While it is common knowledge that directors (and other corporate officers)23
owe a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to the corporation, not much else is uncontroversial in this field. The fierce academic debate and the large number of judicial
opinions that have focused on directors' duties attest to the complexity of the
matter.
In particular, in the past twenty years, commentators have widely discussed
whether directors, in pursuing the corporate benefit, should take into account also
the interests of company creditors.24 Two dominant views have emerged from the
21. See In re Walt Disney Co., Derivative Litig., No. CIV. A. 15452 2005 WL 2056651, at *35-36 (Del. Ch.
2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
22. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879
(1988).
23. This essay, however, does not discuss the duties and responsibilities of corporate officers because of the
vast array of offices that, depending on the size of the corporation, such a qualification may cover. For instance,
in merchant banks, nearly everybody above the employee-level tends to be denominated a vice-president. This
qualification, however, does not imply any of the traditional powers attributed to corporate officers. See
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 180 (2000) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978)).
24. The problem of the beneficiary of directors' fiduciary duties finds its origins in the debate around the
excessive formalism of the academic view that considered the corporate entity itself as the beneficiary of such
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academic debate: those of contractarians and communitarians. Contractarian
scholars oppose the extension of directors' duties to creditors, arguing that the latter's interests can be adequately protected by contract.25 By contrast, communitarians claim that informational and bargaining disparities make non-shareholders
unable to achieve self-protection through contract.26 In turn, they advocate a multifiduciary model" where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of
directors' fiduciary duties.28
These divergent views of directors' duties are explained by the radically different
conception of the corporate entity of the two groups. For communitarians, the
corporation is a social institution tied to its diverse components by means of trust

duties. For some early discussion on the matter, see the debate developed in the 1930s between the shareholder-centered vision of the corporation backed by Columbia Professor Adolf A. Berle and the opposed stakeholder-centered perspective supported by Harvard Professor E. Merrick Dodd. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
25. From the contractarian perspective, because creditors have only a fixed claim over the corporate revenues, the contract would be a sufficient instrument to control current and future contingencies, and, therefore,
to ensure the repayment of creditors' claims. By contrast, as residual claimants, shareholders would be interested in the overall economic performance of the firm, and, therefore, "to protect their interests, they must be
given the right to control the firm." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 449. Under this view, fiduciary
duties would serve essentially to fill in the unspecified terms of the shareholders' corporate contract. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS or LAW 100- 101 (3d ed. 1986); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHIEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1443; Henry
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate FiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23, 28 (1991) [hereinafter
Macey, An Economic Analysis]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 407 (1993) [hereinafter Macey & Miller]; Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary
Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies From a Theory of the Firm Perspective,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274-75 (1999) [hereinafter Macey, Fiduciary Duties]; Mark E. Van Der Weide,
Against FiduciaryDuties to CorporateStakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 34-36 (1996).
26. Employees and lower level corporate officers would be the parties most disadvantaged in terms of
contractual bargaining. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48 (1991); Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the
Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475, 490-91 (1993). See generally, Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance: Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1985).
27. As reported by Professor Bainbridge, the expression multifiduciary model was coined by Professor
Green. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1425 n.6 (citing Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of CorporateGovernance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1419 (1993)).
28. A number of scholars embrace such a view of the corporation. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New
Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 582 (1985); Victor Brudney, Contract and FiduciaryDuty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. REV. 595, 598 (1997); Brudney, supra note 26; Lyman
Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781, 810-11
(1986); Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciaryand the Meaning of CorporateLife and CorporateLaw, 68 TEx.
L. REV. 865 (1990); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFrameworkfor Enforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 585 (1992) [hereinafter Mitchell, CorporateConstituency Statutes]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1170-71 (1990)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Corporate Bondholders]; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,
269-70 (1991); David Millon, Communitarians,Contractariansand the Crisis in CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV 1373, 1381-82 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarians,Contractarians].

VOL. 1 NO. 2 2007

DIRECTORS' DUTY TO CREDITORS AND THE DEBT CONTRACT

and mutual interdependence.29 Thus, they conceive directors as a means to pursue
social welfare and prevent potential shareholders' abuses against non-shareholders.
Contractarians, instead, see the corporation as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals gathered together for the sole purpose of maximizing their profits.3" From this perspective, the exclusive commitment of directors
toward shareholders is viewed as the most efficient way to achieve the profit-maximization goal. 1
B.

A CriticalAssessment

Both the communitarian and the contractarian theories have been the object of
fierce, reciprocal criticism. In such a dispute, two major arguments have been advanced by one group against the other. Contractarians claim that the communitarian idea boosts inefficiency. Communitarians reply that the contractarian view
leads to social injustice.2 In this context, one may thus reasonably believe that a
rule of directors' liability to creditors must necessarily embrace social and/or moral
considerations. On the contrary, my proposal is grounded on a contractarian view
of the firm and is designed to increase corporate and social efficiency.
1.

The Inefficiency of the Multifiduciary Model

Although I share the communitarian idea that directorial fiduciary duties should
not be a tool at shareholders' disposal to expropriate wealth from other corporate
constituencies, I dismiss the multifiduciary model of directors' duties as inefficient
for four reasons. First, I argue that should directors maximize creditor value, as
advocated by communitarians, the only choice at their disposal would be to under29. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarians,Contractarians,supra note 28, at 1379-83; David Millon, Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 260-62 (1990). On the special importance of trustworthiness among
corporate participants, see generally, Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) and Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairnessand Trust
in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993).
30. Although the contractarian theory was developed after the 1980s by legal scholars, its origins can be
traced back to the early 1970s, when the new idea of the firm as a nexus of contracts emerged among economists. Among the seminal economic references, see R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937); Armen A. Achian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Jensen & Meclding, supra note 11.
31. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 441.
32. For a very detailed analysis of the ideological and political differences between the contractarian and
communitarian visions of the corporation, see Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation,80
MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997) (speaking of a conflict between the public-egalitarian claim of communitarians and
the private-individualistic claim of contractarians). For a fierce critique of the communitarian model, see, e.g.,
Bainbridge, supra note 1; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative ContractarianCritique of Progressive CorporateLaw Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1995) (book review). For a communitarian critique of the contractarian position, see, e.g., Millon, Communitarians,Contractarians,supra note 28.
For an independent review of the contractarian theory, see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) and William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The "Nexus of Contracts"Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407 (1989).
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invest. Under such a rule, they should avoid any course of action entailing a risk of
reducing the assets available to satisfy creditors' claims. But corporations need to
take risks to exploit potentially lucrative ventures. Hence, imposing on directors a
duty to maximize creditor value would ultimately result in the reduction of corporate value.3"
Second, as argued by contractarians, when fiduciary duties are owed to two or
more sets of persons who have conflicting interests, they are so difficult to administer that they practically become no duties at all.3" Thus, should directors owe duties
to all stakeholders, not only would they be able to exercise unfettered discretion,
but they would also be likely to become self-serving. Directors could justify virtually any of their actions on the 35
basis of the benefits accruing to one or the other
group of corporate constituents.
Third, the multifiduciary model would tend to increase litigation because a
larger number of parties would have title to commence legal action against directors for the perceived breach of fiduciary duties. 6 As a result, the judicial system
would risk being slowed down by the increase in lawsuits against directors. Moreover, litigation could be abused by creditors seeking to extract extra-profits from
debtor companies.
Finally, the interests of corporate constituencies other than shareholders and
creditors are protected by specific areas of law. For instance, employees' rights are

33. Consider, for instance, a corporation with outstanding debt for $500. The company's directors have
the opportunity to pursue two different investment projects, Project 1 and Project 2. Project I has just one
possible outcome where the corporation earns $900. Under this project, the expected value of debt is $500,
which is equal to its facial value, and the expected value of equity is $400. Project 2 instead has two possible
outcomes: (i) a probability of .8 of yielding $1500; and (ii) a probability of .2 of yielding $300. Thus, Project 2
has a higher NPV ($1,260) than Project 1 ($900). Under Project 2, however, the expected value of debt drops to
$460, although the expected value of equity rises from $400 to $800. Under a legal regime that imposes on
directors a duty to maximize debt value, Project 1 would be the choice to pursue. This, however, would lead
directors to screen out many good investment projects and, therefore, reduce social welfare.
34. This is commonly known as the too many masters argument. Nevertheless, among the same contractarians, some have noticed that the too many masters argument is overstated nowadays. Modern corporations are characterized by a multilayered structure that counts not only different classes of stakeholders but also
multiple classes of common and preferred stock. The interests of these different classes of stockholders may
conflict as may the interests of one class of stakeholders with the other, yet, directors have traditionally been
able to manage their duties to the different categories of stockholders in ways beneficial to the corporation. See
Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra note 25, at 33. In addition, modern financial instruments have further
complicated the corporate scenario. In particular, as regards directors' duties, hybrid securities (i.e., securities
having both characteristics of debt and equity) pose problems which are analogous to those implied by a
potential extension of directorial duties to creditors. Cf. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern
Process of FinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273, 1292-96 (1991)
(arguing that the increasing complexity of the corporate capital structure might challenge shareholder primacy
in the future).
35. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 25, at 412; William J. Cacney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 423-24 (1990).
36. Under the current regime, only security holders, among the various nonshareholder costituencies, can
pursue legal actions against directors by means of securities class actions in federal courts. Yet, even they
cannot sue directors for breach of fiduciary duties.
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secured by labor law; those of consumers, by consumer law; and so on. Hence,
directors' action in favor of these other constituencies could overlap the specific

legal means of protection at the latter's disposal. This would most likely create
uncertainty and, therefore, generate more damage than benefits.
2.

The Limits of the ContractarianPerspective

Endorsing a contractarian view of the corporation, I maintain that creditors' rights,
including any obligations directors might bear toward them, should be determined

by contract. a7 I also claim, however, that under the current model of corporate
governance, informational asymmetry between managers and creditors compromise their ability to write debt contracts that regulate the debtor-creditor relationship pursuant to a welfare-maximization criterion.38 More specifically, the parties'
informational asymmetry makes the debt contract inadequate to restrain managerial opportunism, i.e., the managers' tendency to increase the investment's risk
once the company has incurred indebtedness.
a.

The Managerial Opportunism Problem

From an economic viewpoint, the managerial opportunism problem arises from
the intrinsic conflict between shareholders and creditors. 9 Because of their limited
liability for corporate obligations, as a corporation incurs indebtedness, shareholders have incentives to design the firm's operating characteristics and financial structure in ways that maximize their benefit to the detriment of creditors.4" The
shareholder primacy rule, together with the practice of compensating managers
through equity-based compensation schemes, would extend these incentives to
managers."l Theoretically, managers are more risk averse than the company equity
37. Indeed, "[tihe core insight of [the] nexus-of-contracts paradigm is that contract defines each participant's rights, benefits, duties, and obligations in the corporate endeavor." Macey, FiduciaryDuties, supra note
25, at 1267.
38. See supra note 6.
39. Among the seminal works on the shareholder-creditor conflict, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11,
at 308 (being the first to suggest that an owner-manager, who issues debt before deciding on the investment
policy, can transfer wealth to himself from bondholders by taking on excessive risk); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &
Jerold B. Warner, On FinancialContracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979) [hereinafter Smith & Warner] (analyzing the efficacy of the debt contract to solve the conflict). See also Fischer Black
& John C. Cox, Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions, 31 J. FIN. 351 (1976);
Stewart C. Myers, Determinantsof Corporate Borrowing,5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) [hereinafter Myers]; Merton
H. Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 39-40
(1977); Eugene F. Fama, The Effects of a Firm'sInvestment and FinancingDecisions on the Welfare of Its Security
Holders, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 272 (1978).
40. The problem, however, is not only of distributive nature. In pursuing their interests, shareholders may
well be willing to sacrifice the total firm value undertaking value-reducing actions. See JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 84

(2006).

41. See, e.g., Smith & Warner, supra note 39, at118 (arguing that managers might behave opportunistically
"acting in the stockholders' interest"); Myers, supra note 39, at 149 (referring to "a firm with risky debt outstanding, and which acts in its stockholders' interests"); TIROLE, supra note 40, at 84 (stating that "[mlanagers
and shareholders often have incentives to take actions that ... redistribute wealth from lenders to managers
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holders because they typically make specific investments in one firm and are, therefore, exposed to a significant risk of reputational capital depreciation for the failure
of corporate projects. In addition, like creditors, they do not participate in the
upside potential of corporate projects. Yet, I argue that the shareholder primacy
rule, by making managers liable to shareholders, gives them incentives to pursue
the latter's interests even at the expenses of those of creditors.42 In the modern
corporation, this tendency would be further incentivized by the widespread use of
equity-based compensation plans, which align the interests of managers with those
of shareholders.43
Creditors, however, anticipating the risk that managers may act in the interest of
shareholders to their detriment, specify ex ante contractual provisions to prevent
such a risk.44 In particular, debt contracts are designed to regulate three main
sources of conflict: (i) dividend payment-the expropriation of creditor value determined by the pay-out of corporate assets, in the form of dividends, to shareholders;45 (ii) claim dilution-the devaluing of prior debt by the issuance of subsequent
debt;46 and (iii) asset substitution-the substitution of riskier assets to the firm's
existing assets.
and mainly shareholders."). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' FiduciaryDuties
in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335 (2007) (doubting that managers will act in shareholders'
interest and arguing, instead, that at least some of them "will put their own interest ahead of those of either
shareholders or creditors.") Bainbridge, however, seems to overlook that because of equity-based compensation
schemes, managers' own interests tend often to be the same of those of shareholders.
42. But see Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors' Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 529
(2007) (arguing that directors' fixed claims would counterbalance the incentives they may have to pursue
shareholders' interests to the detriment of creditors and, in fact, make directors' position closer to that of
creditors than shareholders).
43. See, e.g., Guinter Strobl, ManagerialCompensation, Market Liquidity, and the Overinvestment Problem,
(Wharton Sch. Univ. of Pa. Working Paper No. 31, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=567085; Ming Fang & Rui Zhong, Default Risk, Firm's Characteristics,and Risk Shifting, (Yale ICF
Working Paper No. 04-21, 2004); Ajay Subramanian, ManagerialFlexibility, Agency Costs and Optimal Capital
Structure, AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings (Jan. 2002). In fact, equity-based compensation schemes could
even "encourage managers to take far bigger risks than shareholders would wish when they are under water
(that is, when the exercise price of the share option is above the market price of the share)." Beyond Irrelevance,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2006, at 74 (commenting on Tirole's book quoted supra at note 40).
44. These contractual provisions may have either an affirmative or negative nature. Affirmative covenants
"force the borrower to take actions that protect the lender(s) ..
" TiROLE, supra note 40, at 80. Negative
covenants, instead, "place restrictions on the borrower's ability to take decisions that hurt the lender(s)" Id. In
addition, a typical debt contract will include default and other remedy conditions governing the parties' rights
and liabilities in case of termination of the debt-financing relationship. See id.
45. More generally, debt contracts usually provide for covenants restricting payments to shareholders.
These can take several forms, from cash dividend to share repurchase, etc. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 85.
46. More generally, debt contracts usually provide for covenants imposing limitations on further indebtedness, such as covenants against new secured or senior debt, limitations on liens, lease restrictions, etc. Id.
47. Directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, are induced to adopt increasingly risky corporate strategies. At the extreme, they might even have incentives to undertake strategies having a negative net present
value. This is commonly known as overinvestment. Equally, directors might be induced to reject positive net
present value projects simply because the benefits of such projects would accrue exclusively to the firm's bondholders; in such a case, financial theorists talk about underinvestment. The result of overinvestment and underinvestment, however, is identical. Both transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders.
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b.

The Debt. Contract's Inadequacy to Restrain Asset Substition

In my opinion, the debt contract is effective in controlling the first two sources of
conflict, i.e., of managerial opportunism, but it fails to curb managers' tendency to
engage in asset substitution. 8 There are two main reasons for this. First, the remedy normally provided for asset substitution by the debt contract, the debtor's
posting of security or grant of guarantees, may be not effective in protecting creditors' interests. Although security over specific assets might be the best remedy
against risk increasing activities carried out by substituting the debtor's physical
assets, it proves virtually useless with risk increasing activities that can be done
even though the debtor's physical assets remain largely the same. Thus, security
usually protects creditors in the case the debtor sells machines in category A but
buys machines in category B. On the contrary, it might be of little help if the
debtor, for instance, decides to enter a new market. In addition, when the security
interest is unspecified rather than specific assets, even asset substitution concerning
the corporate physical assets might be difficult to deter. Consider, for instance, a
floating security over the firm's inventory.49 In this case, even if creditors enjoyed a
security on the company's physical assets, they would not be protected against the
risk of asset substitution. Directors could still substitute machines category A with
machines category B and, by so doing, depreciate the value of creditors' claims.
Finally, security interests on physical assets tend to be a scarce resource. This means
that not only might it prove rather expensive (i.e., imply a high opportunity cost)
for the debtor to grant a security of this type," but also that there might be situations in which it is not possible for the debtor to post security over specific assets.
This would be the case, for instance, in start-up companies, where most of the
company value is represented by intangible assets.5' In fact, in such circumstances,

48. See Smith & Warner, supra note 39, at 153 (arguing that going "very far in directly restraining the
firm's production/investment policy" might prove inefficient and proposing to use dividend policy and financing policy restrictions to curb the problem of asset substitution indirectly). The solution proposed by Smith
and Warner, however, might imply an extremely high opportunity cost. See id. See also Myers, supra note 39, at
161-62 (confirming that contractual solutions to the asset substitution problem might be so costly to be
unfeasible). For an analysis limited to the case of bondholders, see also Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 235-38 (1988) (arguing that bond covenants are inadequate to protect bondholders from the risk of value expropriation arising from asset substitution).
49. Other examples of security over unspecified assets include the pledge of account receivables or any
other of the firm's accounts.
50. More generally, pledging assets always entails some costs for the debtor. Among the several causes of
deadweight loss attached to collateralization, economic literature has pointed out the following: ex ante and ex
post transaction costs, the presence of ownership benefits not enjoyed by third parties, the suboptimal maintenance of the pledged asset by the borrower, and the opportunity cost entailed by collateralization when the
borrower is, in fact, risk averse. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 167. As to the latter cause, consider, for instance,
the opportunity cost a financially distressed borrower might face when its most valuable assets are pledged.
This may signify that no further lending is available for that borrower, which, in turn, means, most likely, that
the borrower will be forced to file for bankruptcy.
51. For a detailed analysis of the asset substitution and other problems affecting start-up ventures, see
George G. Triantis, FinancialContract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHi. L. REV. 305 (2001).
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lenders most of the time lend against cash flows, rather than against assets.52 This,
in turn, increases the risk of asset substitution.
The second reason of the debt contract's failure to govern the asset substitution
problem is that, unlike dividend payment and claim dilution, asset substitution
cannot be prevented through the imposition of readily verifiable financial parameters. 3 Instead, to bargain for the right investment policy restrictions, creditors need
detailed information on the investment's underlying risk.54 Yet, (i) the informational asymmetry between managers and creditors, paired to (ii) the existing organizational paradigm centered on the shareholder primacy rule (hereinafter, SPR)
and managerial equity-based compensation schemes (hereinafter, MECS) make it
unlikely that creditors may have such information or can rely on it.55 Informational
asymmetry is the phenomenon that occurs when information is differently observable to parties.56 Thus, in the relationship between managers and creditors, the
former have information on the investment's underlying risk that is not observable
to the latter. s7 In addition, being held to the exclusive maximization of share value,
52. In business parlance, it is said that lenders may lend against assets or against cash flows to indicate
whether lending is or is not backed by assets. In the case of lending against cash flows, thus, the expectation of
recovering money is based exclusively on the borrower's ability to generate enough cash. See TIROLE, supra note
40, at 80- 81. From this perspective, security over unspecified assets, given the high risk of asset subst.tution,
would have characteristics more similar to lending against cash flows than secured lending.
53. Examples of accounting and financial covenants, which are designed to control, respectively, the
problems of dividend payment and claim dilution, include covenants providing that the firm's total debt cannot exceed a fraction of total assets (so-called leverage constraint), or covenants requiring that the firm's net
worth exceed at any time some minimum level. Because the breach of accounting and financial covenants
requires always an explicit act, such a breach tends to be readily observable and verifiable by creditors. In
practice, however, ascertaining the violation of these types of covenants might prove more difficult than it
might appear prima facie. First, there are "many possible channels for transferring capital to the firm's owners."
Myers, supra note 39, at 160 (citing Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11). In addition, as evidenced by the recent
wave of corporate scandals, creative accounting and other inefficiencies in the gatekeeping system might make
it difficult to verify the breach of the financial parameters established by the parties. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
GatekeeperFailureand Reform: The Challenge of FashioningLegal Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 326-30 (2004).
54. Cf. TIROLE, supra note 40, at 86 (arguing that "lenders must be well-informed in order to be able to
detect a covenant violation and to properly exercise the power they have in that contingency").
55. Even if creditors might have (some) information on the current status of corporate assets, they commonly lack ex ante information on the projected risk of the firm, which is what really matters to price debt.
From this perspective, a significant distinction between "prospective or value-enhancing information" and "retrospective or value-neutral or speculative information" needs to be drawn. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 334-35.
The former is "information that bears on the optimal course of action to be followed by the firm" and "may be
structural (investments, spinoffs, diversification, etc.), strategic (product positioning ... ), or related to personnel (replacement of management . . . )." Id. Retrospective information, conversely, is a mere measurement of
past managerial performances, without bearing on future decisions. Id. Prospective information may be collected by debtholders to impose specific covenants forcing or preventing a certain course of action or to trigger
a covenant violation. Id. Because retrospective information is much easier to collect than prospective information, however, creditors will tend to have more retrospective than prospective information.
56. See Akerlof, supra note 8, at 489.
57. As pointed out by Myers and Majluf:
[T]he managers' information advantage goes beyond having more facts than investors do. Managers
also know better what those facts mean for the firm. They have an insider's view of their organization
and what it can and cannot do. This organizational knowledge is part of managers' human capital
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and often holding themselves an equity interest in the corporation, managers have
weak incentives to disclose this information to creditors. In fact, under the current
corporate paradigm, they might well be induced to conceal information to borrow
at a lower cost and reserve a costless option to invest in riskier projects.5 8 Moreover,
even when managers disclose information to creditors, the latter would be reluctant
to consider it credible because they expect managers to act in the exclusive interest
of shareholders. 9
c.

The Geometry of Corporate Debt

More analytically, the discourse on the negative externalities deriving by SPR and
MECS needs to be considered in the light of the geometry of corporate debt. From
a strict legal viewpoint, when a corporation concludes a debt contract with a
lender, the parties enter into a bilateral relation. From an organizational viewpoint,
however, a more complicated arrangement comes into existence. Economically, in

....
lAin outside investor who tried to match an equally intelligent manager on this dimension
would probably fail.
Stewart C. Myers & Natalia S. Majluf, CorporateFinancingand Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 196 (1984).
58. Pursuant to option theory (OT), securities, including common stocks and bonds, can be seen as containing options. In particular, the relationship between debtholders and shareholders can be recharacterized as
one in which the former "own" the right to the unlevered firm's cash flow, but sold a call option to the latter to
repurchase the firm's cash flow by paying off the debt on the repayment date (i.e., the option's maturity day).
On such date, if the firm's assets are worth more than the repayment price (i.e., the strike price), the shareholders will exercise their option and buy back the firm; otherwise, they will not exercise the option and default on
the debt. A major determinant of the shareholders' option value is the standard deviation in the future value of
the firm's assets. The greater the standard deviation in the corporate assets' value, holding constant the other
variables, the more the shareholders' option is worth. Indeed, although the option holder will greatly benefit
from an increased assets' value at the option's maturity day, any additional value decrease below the strike price
will not cause her any additional loss. From this perspective, suppose that managers borrow money declaring
to invest in corporate projects with a standard deviation a,. In a very simplified version of the OT, the situation could be seen as follows: (a) the strike price is equal to the loan face value; (b) the option price, Ok, is
equal to the interest portion to be paid by the borrower discounted at the risk free rate. Moreover, we have just
seen that under OT,

a

> 0.
ac,

Thus, if managers, invest expost in a project with a standard deviation or > c, they are paying a cheaper option
price than that actually due to debtholders because the interest rate they have negotiated does not reflect the
effective corporate assets' risk of default. On the OT application as to the debtholder-shareholder conflict, see,
among others, RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 231-51 (1993); SHELDON M. Ross, AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL FINANCE (2d ed.
2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate
Board, 79 WASH U.L.Q. 403, at 411-13 (2001).
59. For the same reason, managers' information might not be totally credible even if made observable to
creditors by gatekeepers (i.e., auditors, securities analysts, investment bankers, etc.). This seems especially true
after the wave of corporate scandals and accounting irregularities that have shaken the trustworthiness of the
gatekeeping system in the past few years. Cf Coffee, supra note 53, at 332-33.
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fact, two distinct agency relationships6" are in play. The first is that between creditors, as principals, and the corporation (i.e., the shareholders), as agent. The second, instead, is that between the corporation (i.e., the shareholders), as principal,
and managers, as agents. Thus, economically, managers can be considered as
(sub)agents of the corporate creditors.
. The following chart illustrates the relationships among creditors, directors,
and
the corporate debtor:
Creditors
Principals

Agent

Corporation
)e

Principal

As shown by the above picture, two different legal instruments govern each relationship. The relationship between creditors and corporation is governed by contract, which means that creditors and the corporate debtor set their respective
obligations in it. Instead, the relationship between corporation and managers is
governed by fiduciary law. In particular, as to the debtor's obligations, the contract
usually specifies rules of corporate governance conduct to which the debtor must
comply during the debt-financing relationship, including provisions on the directors' management of the corporation. From a practical viewpoint, though, the contract's fulfillment depends on managers. In their capacity as corporation's agents,
they are the parties responsible for corporate investment decisions.6' Still, only the
corporation, as contracting party, may be held liable for breach of contract if any
contractual provision is not fulfilled.62 It follows that although managers are
(sub)agents of the creditors-principal, they are not liable toward them, but only
toward the shareholder-principal.

60. In economic terms, agency relationships are those in which "the welfare of one party, termed the
'principal,' depends upon actions taken by another party, termed the 'agent."' Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21 (Kraakman etal.
eds., 2004).
61. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 239 (arguing that although management would not have formal authority over financing decisions, it would have "substantial real control over such decisions" "precisely because it is
superiorly informed").
62.

Among the few making such a distinction, see Ribstein & Alces, supra note 42.
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The outlined geometry of corporate debt makes clearer why the organizational
paradigm based on SPR and MECS may induce managers to pursue risky corporate
projects, whose risk is ultimately imposed on creditors. Indeed, although managers
might risk being held liable to shareholders for not pursuing a potentially successful project, they can never be held liable if the project in question results in a
breach of contract, because the relating cost is externalized on the corporation.63
On the other hand, if the project succeeds, not only will managers please the shareholders, but, in the modern corporation, where managers are often compensated
through equity compensation plans, they will also advance their own interests.
d.

The Suboptimality of Contractual Covenants

As a consequence of the lack of credible information determined by the outlined
geometry of corporate debt (i.e., by the organizational paradigm based on SPR and
MECS), parties tend to draft sub-optimal covenants, which fail to maximize the ex
ante value of their relationship. In particular, they tend to bargain for general,
rather than analytical covenants. The former are covenants which limit the firm's
investment policy by providing for low state-contingent contractual provisions,
such as the obligation not to engage in new lines of business or that limiting the
growth of the firm. Although such covenants offer the advantage of being easily
verifiable, they also tend to restrict the debtor's investment choice. In fact, general
covenants might bear a high opportunity cost.64 They are, therefore, inefficient.6"
63. Still, one could argue that shareholders, being the ones ultimately bearing the contractual breach cost,
would be against managerial actions of the kind described. On the contrary, I argue that the shareholders
would always appreciate these actions as long as the expected gain arising out of the risky project is higher than
the expected liability cost they bear for breach of contract.
64. The opportunity cost is a cost endogenous to any agency-relationship, which consists in the "reduction
in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of th[e] divergence [between the agent's decisions and those
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal]." Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 308
(referring to the opportunity cost in terms of residual loss). As applied to the debtor-creditor relationship, the
opportunity cost is the cost of the reduction in the corporate value maximization due to the side effects of
contractual covenants on managers' ability to pursue optimal investment decision. See Triantis, supra note 51,
at 313 (arguing that "overinclusive covenants" may"prevent the efficient adjustments in the venture in response
to new information acquired by the entrepreneur[s]."); Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and
Renegotiation, 2 J. FiN. INTERMED. 95 (1992) (noting that covenants might inefficiently reduce the firm's flexibility to pursue investments); Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, Investment Opportunitiesand the Design of Debt
Securities, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 136 (1998) (arguing that covenants impose costs by limiting managers'
choices, therefore leading firms that value managerial flexibility to prefer convertibility as a method of reducing
the agency costs of debt).
65. This analysis of general covenants presupposes a textualist interpretative regime of the debt contract.
Under such a regime, imposing a general limit on a specific corporate activity is equivalent to forbid that
activity altogether. Thus, in a textualist interpretative regime, a no-change-of-business-line covenant obliges the
debtor not to undertake any other activity than the one carried out at bargaining, even though the change of
activity is not substantial. Under a contextualist interpretative regime, instead, general covenants become generic covenants. Indeed, under such a diverse regime, contractual provisions that are low state-contingent may
prove more or less restrictive than analytical covenants (which are per se more state-contingent) depending on
the ex post interpretation of the third adjudicator. For instance, in this regime, the conversion of part of a
company's industrial production from automobiles to scooters could be held not to represent a violation of a
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Analytical covenants, instead, specify in details the courses of action that managers can or cannot undertake (that is, they are more state-contingent on the external
state), as in the case of a covenant earmarking the loan for specific purposes.
Hence, they deter managerial opportunism at a lower opportunity cost. Nevertheless, being not as easily verifiable as general contractual restrictions, they tend to
imply higher monitoring costs.66 Indeed, creditors need updated information on
the investment's risk and corporate activity to enforce this type of covenants. Such
information, however, is both expensive and difficult to gather. Managers have, in
fact, even stronger incentives not to disclose private information when its disclosure may trigger a contractual breach.67
Similarly, under the current paradigm of corporate fiduciary law, it seems unlikely that managers may opt for renegotiation in order to undertake a project that
may violate a contractual covenant. Being held to the maximization of share value,
they have weak incentives to disclose information to get the creditors' permission to
do something which is restricted by a specific covenant. On the contrary, especially
if the covenant's breach is not promptly verifiable by creditors, directors may well
be induced to take a risky bet and pursue a new project in violation of the contractual provision. If the project succeeds, shareholders will reap all the benefits; if
things turn out bad, both directors will not be personally liable and shareholders'
loss will be limited. Hence, directors would tend to renegotiate only when the new
project is on the verge of failure.68 At this juncture, however, it is commonly too
late for creditors to rescue their position. Finally, absent a bonding mechanism

no-change-of-business-line covenant. As a result, generic covenants entail a lower opportunity cost than general covenants. Yet, they bear high uncertainty costs, which are the costs arising out of the uncertainty over the
ex post completion of the contract by the third adjudicator. See also infra Part III.B.2.
66. In finance theory, there is a distinction between active and passive monitoring depending on the kind
of information (i.e., prospective or retrospective) required to carried out the monitoring activity. See supra
note 55 (citing TIROLE supra note 40, at 334- 35). Thus, the reference here is to the cost of active monitoring.
See also Mitchell Berlin & Jan Loeys, Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring, 43 J. FiN. 397 (1988) (arguing
that lenders might face large costs of acquiring the necessary information to enforce bond covenants).
67. Consider, for instance, an analytical covenant prohibiting the undertaking of a specific activity. Not
only it seems difficult that creditors could become aware of the undertaking of such a new activity if directors
decide to conceal it, but it seems even more difficult that directors may decide to disclose the relevant information if such a disclosure triggered a default provision.
68. Such tendency of directors would be further incentivized by the fact that, as confirmed by some empirical studies, creditors often prefer not to bring legal action against the company even though they are
seasonably informed on the asset substitution carried out by managers. Under the current regime of corporate
fiduciary law, the costs and uncertainty of the contract's enforcement would, indeed, induce creditors to prefer
out of court settlements to the judicial enforcement of the contract. For some empirical evidence, see Kevin
C.W. Chen & K.C. John Wei, Creditors' Decisions to Waive Violations of Accounting-Based Debt Covenants, 68
AcCTO. REV. 218, 223-31 (1993). Contra Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 217
(1989) (quoting a senior lending officer of a large lender to have said that the point of covenants is to prevent
the firm from changing plans without the creditors' permission). Yet, for the difficulties illustrated above, I
maintain that covenants would not always be able to ensure the renegotiation of the debt contract's terms and
conditions.
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inducing directors to fulfill the contract, even analytical covenants would not be
efficient in governing managerial opportunism.69
e.

The Pooling Mechanism of Debt Pricing

The matter, however, is not only about the contract's failure to govern the managerial opportunism problem efficiently. Anticipating this failure, creditors increase
the cost of capital.7" In addition, because of the scarcity of observable information
and credible signals on the risk underlying corporate assets, creditors are unable to
distinguish good firms (i.e., firms that do not engage in asset substitution) from
bad firms (i.e., firms that engage in asset substitution)." Thus, they tend to pool
firms in risk categories and, being concerned to purchase overvalued claims, price
debt on the basis of the average risk of each category. 2
As a consequence of this mechanism of debt pricing, cross-subsidization and
adverse selection problems arise, and credit capital is inefficiently allocated. Crosssubsidization is the problem that arises when good firms receive worse terms, i.e.,
higher interest rates, from the market than they would if their nature was known;
whereas bad firms receive far better terms. Because of the lack of credible signals,
even if good firms attempted to inform the market on their nature, bad firms
would mimic their behavior and give the market the same signals." For this reason,
the market can once again not discriminate these firms.74 As a result, creditors take
69. See Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN.
1113, 1134 (1995) (providing evidence that creditors frequently write covenants loosely by using standard
boilerplate because restrictive covenants are in practice often inefficient).
70. See Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J.
BANK. & FIN. 391, 396 (1986); Hayne E. Leland, CorporateDebt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital
Structure, 49 J.FIN. 1213, 1223 (1994); Hayne E. Leland & Klaus Bjerre Toft, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, 51 J. FIN. 987, 1010 (1996); Hayne E. Leland, Agency
Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure, 49 J. FIN. 1213 (1998); lan Ericsson, Asset Substitution, Debt
Pricing, Optimal Leverage and Maturity, 21 FINANCE 39 (2000); Triantis, supra note 51, at 307.
71. In credit markets, only debtors can observe the quality of the claims they sell. By contrast, creditors
can observe just the distribution of the quality of the claims that have been issued. See Akerlof, supra note 8, at
489. As a result, the expected value of financial claims is calculated on the average risk. See generally SALANIA,
supra note 12, at 102-06. For an empirical study, see, e.g., Artur Morgado & Julio Pindado, The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: An Analysis Using Panel Data, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT.163, 165-67 (2003). Cf
Ericsson, supra note 70.
72. Consider the following hypothetical. Let's assume that Firm A is seeking debt on the market. Firm A is
a good firm and will respect the promise made to the lender that it will invest in a corporate project whose
standard deviation is 100. On the contrary Firm B, which is a bad one, will not keep the promise made to the
lender to invest in a project with a standard deviation of 100. It will, instead, enter a project whose standard
deviation is 150. Under asymmetric information, lenders (i.e., the capital market) do not know whether they
face a Firm A-borrower (i.e., a good firm) or a Firm B-borrower (i.e., a bad firm). In turn, assuming that
creditors know that in the market there are as many Firm A-borrowers as Firm B-borrowers, they will charge
an interest rate, i, reflecting an average underlying standard deviation of 125 for both firms. Moreover, when
creditors do not know even the distribution of the two kind of borrowers, they could well charge an interest
rate higher than i, assuming that, in fact, Firm A-borrowers are far fewer in number than Firm B-borrowers.
73. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 252 (discussing asymmetric information and the pooling behavior of bad
borrowers).
74. See Ross, supra note 13, at 27 (discussing the failure of good borrowers' signaling as to their type).
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into account the existence of bad firms when pricing debt,7 that is, a good firm's
pledgeable income is discounted by the presence of bad firms.7 6
Adverse selection, instead, is the problem that arises because firms pursuing a
below-average level of asset substitution might be so penalized by the current
mechanism of debt pricing as to drop out of the market77 (what finance theorists
call market breakdown).7 On the contrary, firms pursuing an above-average level
of asset substitution would profit from such a mechanism. Being more likely to
default on their contractual obligations to creditors, they would be less affected by
the rise in interest rates and have all the incentives to stay in the market.7 9 It follows
that adverse selection reduces the quality of loans.80 Finally, because of the abovedescribed problems, creditors might become unwilling to raise interest rates even if
the debtor were willing to pay higher rates for riskier projects.8' That is, they might
start to offer less aggregate credit, 2 with the consequence that good firms and good
business projects might risk going unfunded."3
II.

THE POSITIVE ANALYSIS

The American legislator has not remained indifferent to the debate on corporate
fiduciary duties. Since the 1980s, some twenty American states have enacted stat-

75. Cf.Charles B. Cadsby, Murray Frank & Vojislav Maksimovic, Pooling, Separating,and Semiseparating
Equilibria in FinancialMarkets: Some Experimental Evidence, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 315, 318 (1990) (claiming that,
when managers have better information than potential investors on the value of corporate assets and of corporate projects' likely payoffs, investors will decide "how much to offer for newly issued securities" taking "into
account the presence of less valuable firms"). See also Ross, supra note 13 (arguing that when there is uncertainty in the market and one firm cannot be distinguished from the other, any firm has "a q chance of being a
type A firm," which, translated into the good firms/bad firms dichotomy, means that any firm has a chance of
being a bad firm).
76. In the example discussed supra at note 72, Firm B-borrowers do, in fact, mimic Firm A-borrowers and
declare they will also invest in a project whose standard deviation is 100, although they will invest in one with a
standard deviation of 150. In turn, rational creditors, anticipating the existence of Firm B-borrowers, charge an
interest i for all firms.
77. Thus, in the example discussed supra at note 72, we have just a distributive problem if both firms are
funded. In fact, if i proves too high for the Firm A-borrower, it can well go unfunded. In turn, we have also an
allocative problem. On the adverse selection problem determined by the pooling equilibrium, see generally
SALANI9, supra note 12, at 11-42; BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 12, at 15, 31, 47-96 (2004). See also
Myers & Majluf, supra note 57, at 196; Cadsby et al., supra note 75; Robert Forsythe, Russel Lundholm &
Thomas Rietz, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in FinancialMarkets: Some ExperimentalEvidence, 12
REV. FIN. STUD. 481, 486 (1999).

78. Literally, the expression market breakdown describes "the fact that potential issuers [in the presence of
asymmetric information] may refrain altogether from going to the capital market or, less drastically, limit their
recourse to that market." TIROLE, supra note 40, at 237.
79.

Id. at 113.

80.
81.

Id. at 243.
Id. at 113. On the credit rationing problem, see also BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 12, at 57.

82. Cf.Ericsson, supra note 70, at 27 (showing that firms could afford to take an additional twenty percent
of leverage if the incentives to alter the firm's risk were not present).
83. See Cadsby et al., supra note 75, at 318 (stating that, because of cross-subsidization and adverse selection problems, "opportunities to undertake positive net present value projects" are foregone).
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utes, largely known as corporate constituency statutes,84 which authorize directors
8
to also consider non-shareholder interests in corporate decision-making. " Most of
these statutes, however, did not mandate, but simply permit the consideration of
the interests of employees, creditors, local communities, and other corporate constituencies.86 As a result of such a discretionary feature, commentators have been
widely divided as to the impact of the new legislation on directors' fiduciary
obligations.87

84. Alternatively, the statutes are also known as non-shareholder or non-stockholder constituency statutes.
85. As reported by the American Bar Association, the statutes typically include one or more of the following provisions:
(1) The directors may consider the interests of, or the effects of their action on, various nonstockholder constituencies. (2) These constituencies may include employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and communities in which the corporation has facilities. (3) The directors may consider
the national and state economies and other community and societal considerations. (4) The directors
may consider the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders. (5) The directors may consider the possibility that the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders may best be served by remaining independent. (6) The directors may consider any other
pertinent factor. (7) Officers may also be covered.
American Bar Association (ABA), Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor
Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2261 (1990).
Among the several states that have adopted corporate constituency statutes, see, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§10-1202(A) (West 1990); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 607-111(9) (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (Michie 1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 32/8-85 (West 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-135-1(d)(f)(g) (West 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 490.1108 (West 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)
(LexisNexis 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-92(G) (West 1991); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West
1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.347(4) (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(l) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(4) (West 1990);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 717(b) (McKinney 1991); OHIO
REV.CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2003); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51 l(d), (e), (g) & 1721(e), (f), (g) (West 1990); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 4733-4 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2002); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16-830 (1989).
86. It should be noted, however, that even though the Indiana's statute does not compel directors to
consider non-shareholder interests, its wording is difficult to reconcile with the idea of shareholder primacy.

The statute gives directors "full discretion" in the selection of the corporate interests to pursue and specifies
that they may weigh each group of interests "as they deem appropriate." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Lexis-

Nexis 1999). In addition, it also provides that "directors are not required to consider the effects of a proposed
corporate action on any particular corporate constituent group or interest as a dominant or controlling factor."
Id.
87. Once again, communitarians and contractarians have supported opposite views. For the former, the
statutes have represented a desirable first step toward a new egalitarian model of corporate law, in which social
welfare maximization takes the place of share value maximization as the fundamental corporate governance
rule. See generally, Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 28; Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary, supra
note 28; Mitchell, CorporateConstituency Statutes, supra note 28; Marleen O'Connor, Restructuringthe Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189
(1991). For contractarians, instead, the statutes are "an idea whose time should never have come." James. J.
Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, 3 INSIGHTS
20 (1989). Hence, they should be interpreted restrictively. This means that non-shareholder interests should be
taken into consideration only when a simultaneous benefit accrues to shareholders. Only in this way, would the
risk be avoided that incumbent directors might undertake self-driven decisions adducing uncertain non-shareholder interests. See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 85, at 2269, that states:
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In my view, the statutes are part of a broader trend suggesting a need to review
the traditional shareholder-centered vision of the corporation."5 The openness to
the case of non-shareholders showed in some circumstances by Delaware courts, 89
the most influential corporate law courts in this country, should also be regarded as
part of this trend (especially if one considers that Delaware does not belong to the
list of states that have enacted corporate constituency statutes). In fact, the debate
on directors' duties to creditors has been largely shaped by two opinions of the
Delaware Court of Chancery: the 1991 Credit Lyonnais opinion and the more recent
Production Resources opinion.
A.

Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.

1. From the Insolvency Exception to the FinancialDistress Exception
Traditionally, the insolvency exception has represented the only circumstance
under which American courts have acknowledged a duty of directors to creditors.
The idea that corporate insolvency shifts directorial duties toward creditors can be
traced back to the trust fund doctrine of early American corporate law,9" which
The Committee believes that the better interpretation of these statutes, and one that avoids . ..
consequences [on corporate efficiency], is that they confirm what the common law has been: directors may take into account the interests of other constituencies but only as and to the extent that the
directors are acting in the best interests ... of the shareholders and the corporation.
Id. See also, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 25; DeBow & Lee, supra note 1,at 398-405; James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Playing with Fire:Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 110 (1991); James
J. Hanks Jr., EvaluatingRecent State Legislation on Directorand Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification,
43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1227-29 (1988).
88. In similar terms, but advocating a communitarian-oriented reading of this trend, see Mitchell, Corporate Constituency Statutes, supra note 28, at 585, who observes that the "statutes are part of a trend suggesting a
need for legal recognition of constituent interests within the corporate structure." In my idea, instead, the
statutes would signal a more limited need for reviewing, not rebutting, the shareholder primacy rule.
89. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (dismissing a shareholder
derivative action against the company directors, stating that the adoption of anti-takeover measures could be
justified by the consideration of the interests of "'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)"); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1144 n.4, 1150 (Del. 1989) (upholding the decision of Time's directors to prefer uncertain longterm strategies over short-term shareholders' gains on the basis of the board's duties tomaintain the company
as an independent enterprise and to protect "Time culture"); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987) (affirming the right of directors to refuse a hostile bid on the ground of the
consideration of broad corporate interests); TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 5 94334, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (upholding the defensive measures adopted by the
board in a hostile takeover context, on the basis of the consideration of the "'shareholder long term interests' or
'corporate entity interests' or 'multi-constituency interests'" as opposed to the "'shareholder short term interests' or 'current share value interests"').
90. On the trust fund doctrine, see, e.g., Joseph Jude Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate
Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus.
LAW. 1061 (1975); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation'sBoard of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to
its Creditors?,25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589 (1994); Stephen R. McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden from Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 186-95 (1994); Ann E.
Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigmat CorporateInsolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J.CORP. L. 1, 76-91 (1995). Among the very earliest comments on the
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established that the corporate assets of a company facing dissolution were to be
held in trust for the benefit of its creditors.9' From an economic viewpoint, the
exception finds its justification in the fact that, when a corporation becomes insolvent, the position of creditors and shareholders exchange, with the former taking
the place of the latter as the parties having an equitable interest in the corporate
assets.92
In 1991, however, a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.," announced that "[alt least
where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors
is not merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."94 And in the court's opinion the concept of corporate enterprise
encompassed "the community of interest[s] that sustained the corporation,"9" including creditors' interests. Then, in a now-famous footnote, Chancellor Allen, the
decision's extensor, explained why under such circumstances creditors should benefit from the attribution of directors' fiduciary duty: "[t] he possibility of insolvency
can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic
behavior and creating complexities for directors."96
By hinting at the managerial opportunism problem, the elaboration of directors'
duty to creditors formulated in the Credit Lyonnais decision has represented a step

doctrine,
TERED

see JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINIS-

IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA, Ch. 3, 33, 43 (1886); and Note, The "Trust Fund" Theory, 9 HARV. L. REV.

481 (1896).
91. The leading case on the trust fund doctrine is Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (C.C.D. Me.
1824) (No. 17,944). Other well known early cases include Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371
(1893); Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 120 A. 852 (Del. Ch. 1923); and Asmussen v. Quaker City
Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931).
92. See Stephen L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation'sObligationsto Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647,
667 (1996) (assimilating creditors' rights upon insolvency to that of shareholders of solvent corporations);
Laura Lin, Shift of FiduciaryDuty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1993) (defining creditors of insolvent corporations as new residual claimants of the
firm); Cristopher L. Barnett, Healthco and the "Insolvency Exception": An Unnecessary Expansion of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 450-51 (2000) (arguing that, upon insolvency, the rights of shareholders and
creditors exchange).
93. CIV. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099
(1991). The factual circumstances of the case involved a legal suit commenced by the company's creditors for
defending their rights under a restructuring plan and, in particular, the validity of certain provisions that
excluded the major shareholder from the management and control of the corporate activity. For a detailed
account of the case, see, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 92, at 669-97; Lipson, supra note 1, at 1208-29; Vladimir
Jelisavcic, CorporateLaw-A Safe HarborProposal to Define the Limits of Directors' Fiduciary Duties to Creditors
in the "Vicinity of Insolvency:" Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe, 18 J. CORP. L. 145, (1992).
94.

Credit Lyonnais, supra note 18, at 1155.

95. Id. at 1157. Which corporate constituencies belong to the corporation's"community of interest[s]" and
how directors should balance these different interests has been largely debated among commentators. Id. There
seem to be no doubts, however, that the ambiguous expression used by the Credit Lyonnais court intended to
include corporate creditors.
96.

Id. at 1155 n.55.
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forward compared to the traditional insolvency exception approach.97 What the
Credit Lyonnais court overlooked, however, is that a corporation does not need to
be in financial distress (i.e., in the vicinity of insolvency) for the managerial opportunism risk to arise. As discussed above,9" it is sufficient that a firm has outstanding
debt in order that its managers might have incentives to behave opportunistically.
Financial distress would merely
increase such incentives,99 inducing managers "to
gamble for resurrection."'° Therefore, unlike most commentators, I argue that the
problem with the Credit Lyonnais opinion does not lie in the uncertainty of the

97. Not surprisingly, the decision has caused upheaval and been extensively reviewed by corporate scholars. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Court Has a New Idea on Directors' Duty, 1992 NAT'L L.J. 18 (March 2, 1992);
Lipson, supra note 1, at 1208-12; Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed
Corporations,7 GEo. MASON L. REV. 45 (1998); Richard M. Cieri, Partick F. Sullivan & Heather Lennox, The
FiduciaryDuties of Directors of Financially Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405 (1994); Rima Fawal
Hartman, Situation-SpecificFiduciary Dutiesfor CorporateDirectors:Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761 (1993); Jelisavcic, supra note 93, at 153-58; McDonnell, supra note 90, at
178-80; C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations:A Comment on Credit Lyonnais,
19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993); Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow & Derek White, FiduciaryDuty a laLyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-DistressedFirm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53
(1994); Mike Roberts, The Conundrum of Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations,23 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 273, 286-90 (1993); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the
FinanciallyTroubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239, 240-43 (1992); Lin, supra note 92, at 1521-23; Barnett, supra
note 92, at 451-56; Daniel J. Winnike, Credit Lyonnais: An Aberrationor an Enhancement of Creditors' Rights in
Delaware?, 6 INSIGHTS 31 (1992).
98.

See supra Part l.B.2.a.

99. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1553-54 (2004) (book
review); Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-BankruptcyInvestment Incentives, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 575,
576-77 (1995); Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory
Explanation, 37 I.L. & EcoN. 157, 157 (1994); Lin, supra note 92, at 1488-91; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 669, 684 (1993). But see Barondes, supra note 97, at 48-63. According to Barondes, covenants directly
restricting the firm's investment policy, in concurrence with financial covenants that indirectly do so, would
deter excessive risk-taking by financially-distressed firms. For a discussion of the problems affecting investment
policy restrictions, see supra Parts l.B.2.b, l.B.2.d. As to the role played by financial covenants, instead,
Barondes seems to neglect that the threat of accelerating the loan risks proving more harmful, than beneficial
for creditors. Indeed, its exercise may lead to a paralysis of the production of cash flow, which could nullify
creditors' expectation of repayment. Managers know this. Thus, it seems difficult that the creditors' threat of
accelerating the loan may deter managers from overinvesting. For these reasons, it is unlikely that "creditors of
firms that are nearly insolvent ... may have an incentive to cause the covenants to be triggered." Barondes,
supra note 97, at 52. This would be also confirmed by the empirical studies cited supra at note 68. As a matter
of fact, creditors would cover the risk of a downfall in the interest rate applied to the debtor's loan through
other legal instruments, such as hedge contracts. In addition, the empirical data offered by Barondes would not
be decisive in proving the lack of incentives to overinvest of financially distressed firms' managers. What matters is not that "only forty-six percent [in a survey of reorganized or liquidated firms] ...had 'made acquisitions or started new ventures,'" but rather what was the average level of asset substitution undertaken by this
forty-six percent. Barondes, supra note 97, at 60. As previously discussed, creditors would not be able to
distinguish between good and bad firms, but would price debt by pooling firms together and calculating the
average risk. Thus, that forty-six percent (which, anyway, does not seem a low number) could well have determined an increase in the cost of debt for all firms.
100. TIROLE, supra note 40, at 85. See also MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS (1994); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-ShareholderCongruence, 109 Q. J.EcoN. 1027, 1049 (1994).
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vicinity of insolvency standard,' but rather in that this opinion still conceives of
the duty to creditors as shifting upon a determined condition (or its vicinity). If the
duty's existence is justified by the managerial opportunism risk, as the Credit Lyonnais court seems to suggest, creditors should be entitled to it beginning with the
signing of the credit agreement because directors' incentives to behave opportunistically start at that moment.
2.

The Inadequacy of the NPV Test
The major flaw of the Credit Lyonnais decision, however, is the test of directors'
liability it suggests. Pursuant to the analysis carried out by the court, to avoid liability to creditors, directors of distressed corporations should undertake only corporate projects with a positive net present value (NPV). 02 In the court's opinion, by
barring investments that might reduce the overall value of the firm, such a liability
rule would "maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity."'' 3 I
argue, by contrast, that not only does the NPV test fail to maximize corporate
value, but it is an inadequate test of directors' conduct. There are three basic reasons for my claims. First, the NPV test does not consider the effects that a change
in the investment's level of risk may have on creditor value. Second, it ignores the
option value that is almost always embedded in corporate investments. Third, it
neglects the fact that creditors do accept certain investment risk at signing.
Changes in the risk level of corporate projects might transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders even though these projects have the same net present value." 4
It is indeed apparent that an investment in a high-tech startup yields much different prospects for creditor value than an investment in government bonds although
the face value of the two investments is the same. This holds true not just for riskfree investments, but for any change in the risk level of corporate projects. The
101. Most of the criticisms moved against the Credit Lyonnais decision have focused on the vicinity of
insolvency standard, arguing that it creates uncertainty and ambiguity both as to its timing and scope. See, e.g.,
Lipson, supra note 1, at 1208 (arguing that "Credit Lyonnais moved beyond the event/condition paradigm to an
unmapped (perhaps unmappable) coordinate . . ."); Conaway Stilson, supra note 90, at 64 (claiming that
imposing such a duty on directors of "nearly insolvent corporations provides fertile ground for Monday-morning quarterbacking by competing corporate constituencies"); Schwarcz, supra note 92, at 671- 72 (claiming that
the vicinity of insolvency standard is too difficult to define and evaluate); Barnett, supra note 92, at 465 (defining the vicinity of insolvency standard as a "fuzzy concept[ ]"); Rao et al., supra note 97, at 62-64 (talking of
the vicinity of insolvency standard as a phrase without any clear significance).
102. Credit Lyonnais, supra note 18, at 1156, n.55. The court's hypothetical illustrating the NPV test assumes a solvent corporation with a sole asset, an appeal judgment for $51 million, and outstanding bonds for
$12 million. The decision's possible outcomes include a twenty-five percent chance of affirmance, a seventy
percent chance of a payment of $4 million, and a five percent chance of reversal, resulting in an expected value
of litigation of $15.5 million. In the hypothetical, however, the company directors also receive two different
cash offers to settle, respectively for $12.5 million and $17.5 million. Pursuant to the court's test, directors that
"mnsider the community of interests that the corporation represents" rather than the sole shareholders' interests, would "accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than $ 15.55 million," that is, any
offer increasing the overall firm value. Id.
103. Id. at 1157.
104. See also Morris, supra note 97, at 65-68.
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NPV test, then, does little to help directors to choose among a range of investment
opportunities having all the same gross value, but different volatility. In other
words, in such circumstances, the test is of poor guidance to identify ex ante the
corporate strategy that maximizes the firm's value.
Furthermore, the test may result in inefficient corporate decisions. On the one
hand, the test may promote, rather than deter, managerial opportunism because it
induces directors to pursue projects with a high NPV regardless of their risk profile.' On the other hand, by overlooking the option components of corporate investments, 10 6 the test may lead to forfeiting valuable business opportunities. As well
known to finance theorists, corporate projects can be better evaluated by looking at
them as including hidden options" 7 (on timing, expansion, closing, flexibility,
etc.), 0 8 and by applying pricing theory to evaluate the implicit value of those options, 10 9 rather than by adopting traditional valuation theories, such as the NPV

105. Imagine, for instance, that the possible outcomes of the appeal in the Credit Lyonnais hypothetical
include only a thirty-five percent chance of affirmance and a sixty-five percent chance of reversal. Under such a
different hypothesis, the litigation alternative would have an expected value of $17.85 million. Thus, pursuant
to the NPV test, the company directors should reject both settlement offers and go to court. In so doing,
however, the directors would effectively accept a bet having the sixty-five percent chance of wasting both
shareholders' and creditors' investment. Not exactly what one would expect from a liability rule that, in the
words of one eminent commentator, should "minimize[ I the social waste from the perverse incentive to gamble on the doorstep of insolvency." Coffee, supra note 97, at text following n.22.
106. Option theory (OT), which begins with the development in 1973 of the Black and Scholes model to
calculate the value of a stock option, individuates five fundamental determinants to evaluate an option: (i)
value of the underlying asset, (ii) time to maturity, (iii) interest rate, (iv) exercise price, and (v) volatility of the
underlying assets. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricingof Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81 J. POL.
EcoN. 637, 640 (1973). Since the development of the Black and Scholes formula, however, OT has been held
relevant to almost any area of finance. For instance, by re-classifying shareholders of a firm that has issued debt
as holders of a call option to buy back the firm's assets on the debt maturity, OT permits to illustrate the
perverse incentives shareholders may have to increase the value of their option simply by increasing the volatility of the underlying assets. See supra note 58. On OT, see generally GILSON & BLACK, supra note 58, at 231-51.
For an illuminating discussion on the application of OT to a wide range of legal subjects, see IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
107. In business parlance, such hidden options are known as real options. More specifically, a real option is
defined as the right, but not the obligation to acquire the present value of the expected cash flows by making an
investment when the opportunity is available. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 616-39 (7th ed. 2003); LENOS TRIGEORGIs, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION (1996).
108. A real option valuing the ability to wait and resolve uncertainty is called a timing option; an option to
learn about an uncertain quantity or technology is called a learning option; an option to abandon the project if
unsuccessful is called an exit or abandonment option; an option to invest now and make follow-up investments
if the original project is successful is called a growth or expansion option; etc. See generally BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 107, at 616-39.
109. Real options can thus be considered a loan on the opportunity to make further investment. In OT
terms, because the option's exercise price is the cost of the investment in the specific project, the option value
increases when the expected cash flows are higher than that of the original investment. Thus, the higher the
uncertainty of the potential cash flows, the higher the value of the option. See Keith J. Leslie & Max P. Michaels,
The Real Power of Real Options, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 413 (1997); AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994).
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analysis."' Indeed, even investment with a negative NPV may be profitable if evaluated through the real options technique of capital budgeting."' Similarly, investments with lower NPV may actually be superior if their option components are
taken into consideration." 2
Finally, the NPV test fails to consider that creditors do accept a certain level of
risk when they conclude their contract with the corporation, and that they price
capital accordingly. In fact, anticipating the debt contract's inadequacy to prevent
managerial opportunism, creditors also apply an extra premium over the interest
rate they ask to cover themselves against the investment's underlying risk."' Hence,
to hold directors liable for the repayment of creditors' claims, as the CreditLyonnais
court seems to suggest, is wrong. As long as directors respect the risk accepted by
creditors, they should not be held liable, not even in the case of a default on payment. Indeed, creditors are ex ante compensated for bearing that risk. From a realoption perspective, one could thus say that as long as directors pay for it, they can
exercise whatever option is embedded in a corporate investment.
B.

Production Resources Group L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.

In November 2004, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a new, crucial opinion
on directors' duties to creditors:".4 Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT
110. See CHRIS WALTERS & TIM GILES, LONDON SCH. ECON., Using Real Options in Strategic Decision Making 4 (2000), http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/paradigm/spring2000/pdf/waters.pdf("[V]aluing irreversible investment opportunities under uncertainty using NPV does not take account of managerial options and treats
capital assets as passively held. A real options approach can help by valuing these managerial intangibles and
preventing mistakes."); Thomas E. Copeland & Philip T. Keenan, Making Real Options Real, 3 MCKINSEY Q.
129, 129 (1998) (arguing that "traditional analytical methods such as net present value ... have been responsible for systematic underinvestment and stagnation" and that "NPV... ignore[s] an important reality: business
decisions in many industries ... can be implemented flexibly through deferral, abandonment, expansion, or in
a series of stages that in effect constitute real options"). Cf George G. Triantis, Organizationsas Internal Capital
Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral,and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1103 (2004) (arguing that managerial flexibility, intended as option to switch, can prove
very valuable).
111. Consider, for instance, the case of a small company having the option to invest in a new technology.
The new technology has a fifty percent probability of working well and generating revenues for $16 million,
and a fifty percent probability of not working and generating losses of $18 million. The cost of waiting to make
this investment (i.e., the timing option's cost) is equivalent to $3 million (equal to the cost of decrease sales as a
result of not having the greatest product features for lack of adequate equipment). Pursuant to the NPV technique of capital budgeting, the project should not be undertaken. Indeed it would have a negative NPV. (The
NPV of investing today is equal to: (16M)(.5)-(18M)(.5) = -IM. Yet, it could still be worth pursuing it if one
considers the embedded timing option it contains. If one waits and sees until the risk the new equipment might
not work is eliminated, the project's value becomes: (16M)(.5)-(0)(.5)-3M = 5M.) Thus, by ignoring management's ability to wait until the risk that the equipment might not work is eliminated, the NPV analysis may
lead the management to forfeit a valuable investment opportunity.
112. AYRES, supra note 106.
113. See supra Part l.B.2.e.
114. For other decisions on directors' duties to creditors following the CreditLyonnais opinion, see Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 790 (1992) (holding that "fiduciary duties to creditors arise when one is
able to establish the fact of insolvency"); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v.
Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994) (denying motion to
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Group, Inc.' Although much of what the court said on the matter is in dicta, such
a decision represents the most influential pronouncement on managerial duties to
creditors since that of Chancellor Allen. The opinion makes four central points as
to creditors' fiduciary duty claims against directors:
(i) Absent bad faith or self-dealing, both creditors of solvent corporations and of
corporations in the vicinity of insolvency have no standing to bring fiduciary duty
claims against directors." 6 According to Vice Chancellor Strine, the decision's extensor, creditors would have other legal tools at their disposal to protect their interests, namely the contract and specific bodies of law (i.e., fraudulent conveyance law
and federal bankruptcy law)." 7 Thus, "[slo long as the directors honor the legal
obligations they owe to the company's creditors in good faith, as fiduciaries they
may pursue the course of action that they believe is best for the firm and its
stockholders.""18
(ii) The Credit Lyonnais opinion did not intend to create a new set of fiduciary
duties to the benefit of creditors of financially distressed companies. Instead, it gave
directors of such companies a shield against shareholders' claims which alleged that
dismiss the creditors' fiduciary duty claim because the company was within the zone of insolvency at the time
the relevant managerial decisions were taken); Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 583-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating
that directors may owe fiduciary duties to creditors if the corporation is "in the vicinity of insolvency"). See also
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l,
Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Miramar Res., Inc. v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
115. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). The factual background of the decision involved a claim brought against
the directors of the NCT Group (NCT) by one of its creditors, Production Resources Group (PRG). Charges
brought against the directors included the failure to comply with a judgment condemning NCT to pay PRG
and the attempt to avoid payment in several ways (including the issuance of more shares than were authorized,
the grant of inappropriate liens, and other benefits in favor of directors themselves, etc.). For a much more
detailed articulation of the facts of the case, see Pamela L.J. Huff & Russel C. Silberglied, From Production
Resources to People Department Stores: A Similar Response by Delaware and CanadianCourts on the Fiduciary
Duties of Directors to Creditors of Insolvent Companies, 1 1. Bus. & TECH. L. 455 (2007). Substantially reproducing the content of Production Resources, see also Ribstein & Alces, supra note 42. Among other articles discussing the decision, see, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 41, at 347-48; Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of
Insolvency, I J. Bus. & TECH. L. 607 (2007); Frank Partnoy, FinancialInnovation and CorporateLaw, availableat
http://www.uiowa.edul-lavjcl/Financial%201nnovation%20and%20Corporate%2Law.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2006) (paper presented at the University of Iowa College of Law 2005 Symposium in honor of Professor Bob
Clark).
116. Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 787-91.
117. Id. at 787.
118. Id. Later in the decision, the Chancellor specifies that, given the protection granted by the contract and
these specific bodies of law:
[W]hen creditors are unable to prove that a corporation or its directors breached any of the specific
legal duties owed to them, one would think that the conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant.
Having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm's creditors, the board would, in that
scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk for the benefit of the firm's equity owners, so long
as the directors comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing with fidelity
and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm's value.
Id. at 790.
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they acted too conservatively in managing the company's affairs." 9 Indeed, the business judgment rule protects directors who undertake less risky corporate strategies
in the belief that riskier ones might compromise the company's ability to meet its
legal obligations to the corporate creditors. This, however, does not mean that directors' duties shift to creditors. Directors of corporations in the vicinity of insolvency do not have an obligation to pursue less risky corporate strategies. On the
contrary, they remain free to exercise their business judgment to select the course
of action they deem to be in the best interest of the corporation (i.e., which maximizes the corporate value).
(iii) Corporate insolvency neither changes the object of directors' fiduciary duties, which continues to be the corporation itself, nor its content, which remains
the obligation to maximize the firm's value. Insolvency simply transfers the right to
pursue derivative claims against directors for fiduciary improper conduct from
shareholders to creditors, the new residual claimants of the firm.
(iv) Being that the fiduciary claims of creditors of insolvent corporations derivative in nature, directors of such corporations can be protected from personal liability for creditors' claims under charter exculpation provisions adopted pursuant to
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.' 21 Policy reasons
would also induce one to interpret section 102(b)(7) in this sense. Otherwise, the
primary purpose of the section, "to encourage directors to undertake risky, but
potentially value maximizing, business strategies,"' 2 1 would be largely frustrated.
Indeed, it is when a corporation becomes insolvent that the risk of judicial hindsight bias about directors' business decisions is more likely. Therefore, it is in that
moment that the protection granted by exculpatory provisions becomes most
needed.
1. Some Preliminary Comments
Although the actual impact of the ProductionResources opinion on directors' duties
to creditors will depend on whether other members of the Delaware Court of
Chancery and other judges will follow its ruling, some preliminary comments can
be drafted.
Endorsing a contractarian view of corporate law, I basically share Chancellor
Strine's vision of directors' duties to creditors and agree that the essential legal
instrument to protect creditors' interests is the debt contract. Nevertheless, I also
119. Id. at 788.
120. Pursuant to § 102(b)(7), under Delaware law, a corporation may include in its certificate of incorporation a provision exculpating directors from personal liability "to the corporation or its stockholders" for monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care. In contrast to some previous decisions, in Production
Resources, the court stated that § 102(b)(7) protects directors even against suits brought by creditors. According
to the court, because creditors' claims are derivative in nature, the corporation is the one actually bringing suit
against directors. Therefore, the literal wording of § 102(b)(7) is respected and the section can be applied to
exculpate directors.
121. Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 777.
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claim that the debt contract, as currently devised, is an imperfect instrument to
regulate the debtor-creditor relationship. In particular, I challenge the Chancellor's
idea that creditors' contractual protection is complete and that using the law of
fiduciary duty in this context would lead "to fill gaps that do not exist."2 Although
"[cireditors are

. . .

protected by strong covenants,' 2 I have previously discussed

why such covenants are often inefficient in governing managerial opportunism.'24
Similarly, I have also showed that, at least in relation to risk-increasing activities
carried out without substituting the debtor's physical assets, the posting of liens or
other security is of limited use. 2 Furthermore, the alleged protection granted to
creditors by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing risks proving more
harmful than beneficial. The uncertainty surrounding the scope and content of the
good faith obligation may lead to judicial activism in contract interpretation, which
may prove detrimental when parties are sophisticated ones,'26 as it happens in the
debtor-creditor relationship.
Indeed, although I share the traditional law and economics view of the good
faith obligation as the rule of law prohibiting each contracting party from taking
advantage of the contract's incompleteness to expropriate her counterparty's expected contractual benefits, I challenge the law and economics argument supporting the efficiency of good faith. For law and economics scholars, good faith reduces
contractual specification cost by supplementing the parties' agreement with a general term that prevents opportunistic behavior. This view, however, overlooks the
higher risk of judicial error that parties face when courts interpret their agreement
pursuant to the obligation of good faith (i.e., under a good-faith interpretative
regime). Under such a regime, the court is not obliged to abide by the express

122. Id. at 790.
123. Id.
124. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
125. See supra Part l.B.2.b.
126. Parties may have either an unsophisticated or sophisticated nature. Sophisticated parties include corporate entities and other business forms (such as limited partnerships, for instance) which operate in commer." Schwartz & Scott, Contract
cial context and are "expected to understand how to make business contracts.
Theory, supra note 6, at 545. This means that they are repeat players in the industry in which they operate,
regularly conclude contracts of one or more particular commercial types, and know well the economic substance of their exchanges. In addition, sophisticated parties enjoy economic, informational, and, most of the
time, organizational resources. In turn, they are able to assess their risk adequately and write contracts that
contain such a risk. Unsophisticated parties are defined residually as those that are not sophisticated. Hence,
these parties will normally tend to be individuals or other commercially unsophisticated entities that conclude
sporadic and heterogeneous transactions, mostly in the context of simple transactional environments (such as
one-time sales of relatively low-value, common, goods). In addition, unsophisticated parties have limited economic and informational resources. As a result, they might both have a scarce understanding of the economics
of their exchanges and not be able to assess their risk adequately. Moreover, their bounded rationality may well
lead to cognitive errors and to inefficient allocations of entitlements. On the dichotomy between sophisticatedunsophisticated parties, see, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts
Between Sophisticated Parties:A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 1. L. Econ. &
Org. 230, 248 (1993); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignoranceand Information Forcing Rules, American Law & Economics
Association, Annual Meeting, Paper 22 (2004).
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terms of the contract, but can determine in its own discretion what good faith
means in relation to both specified and unspecified contingencies. This means that
the court might make errors even if the parties' entitlements are dearly specified by
express provisions. Thus the inclusion of the good faith obligation in the parties'
agreement would prove efficient only when the specification cost that it permits the
parties to save exceeds the expected cost they bear due to the higher likelihood of
judicial error. Put differently, the obligation of good faith would imply a trade-off
between specification cost saving and expected cost deriving from judicial error
(the "good faith trade-off"). I then claim that, in the case of unsophisticated parties,
the good-faith trade-off would almost always be positive because these parties' contracts will tend to be "necessarily incomplete" due to bounded rationality, limited
economic resources, and informational deficit. On the contrary, in the case of sophisticated parties, the good-faith trade-off would tend to be negative given the
complexity of the underlying agreement and the consequently higher probability of
judicial error.
Finally, even admitting that debt contracts are complete, the Production Resources perspective seems to overlook that the contract does not bind directors but
only the corporation. Thus, even admitting that a duty of directors to creditors is
not needed to fill in gaps in the contract; such a duty would still be desirable to give
directors the right incentives to fulfill the contract.
As to the test of directors' conduct devised by ProductionResources, i.e., the good
faith fulfillment of all legal obligations owed to creditors, I wonder whether, pursuant to such a test, directors who increase the investment's risk ex post should be
held liable to creditors. Indeed, ProductionResources seems to emphasize two different dimensions of good faith. First, there would be a horizontal dimension, concerning the relationship between corporation and creditors, in which good faith is
conceived of as contractual gap filler. From this perspective, the decision would
promote the adoption of a contextualist interpretative regime of the debt contract.
As just seen, I take issue with such a view and claim that the adoption of this
regime would produce uncertainty in legal relationships. For this reason, to increase efficiency, a textualist interpretative regime should, instead, be adopted." 7
Nevertheless, there would be also a vertical dimension, concerning the relationship between corporation and managers, in which good faith qualifies as a managerial duty.'28 In this sense, pursuant to Production Resources, the good faith
fulfillment of directors' legal obligations, including those arising from the debt con127. See infra Part III.B.
128. The Delaware case law is far from clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of
good faith. The answer, however, seems most likely negative. Cf Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del.Ch.
2000) (arguing that the duty of good faith is an independent concept, whose "utility may rest in its constant
reminder ... that, regardless of his motive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation
and its stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes"). Still, it
seems undoubted that good faith in the corporate realm assumes a different connotation than good faith in the
contractual context.
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tract, would exempt directors from liability.'29 Therefore, I wonder whether the
directors' intentional breach of the parties' agreement as to the investment's underlying risk can be considered a breach of the vertical dimension of good faith. In
accordance with a more recent decision of the Delaware Chancery Court, In re Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation13 ° [hereinafter, Disney], the answer would
seem affirmative. Indeed, in Disney, the court explained: "[a] failure to act in good
faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary... intentionallyfails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregardfor his duties."131
Under this view, the debt contract's provisions on the directors' management of the
corporation might well be deemed to constitute a known duty of directors. Hence,
an intentional breach of such contractual provisions would represent a breach of
the vertical dimension of good faith.'
33
Finally, I argue that the broad application of the business judgment rule (BJR)1
restated by the Production Resources opinion, together with the contextualist interpretative regime advocated therein, risks stressing the problem of managerial opportunism. Contrary to other commentators,'34 I maintain that if the BJR was
extended also to creditors' claims, managers could justify virtually any action they
undertake on the basis of their business judgment, regardless of what was established by the debt contract. Thus, they would become even more likely to undertake asset substitution corporate projects. Ultimately, then, the extension of the BJR
to creditors' claims would jeopardize, rather than secure, the maximization of the
firm's value.
III.

A NORMATIVE THEORY

I have previously individuated four basic problems in the current approach to corporate fiduciary law: (i) the inadequacy of the debt contract to govern the debtorcreditor relationship efficiently; (ii) the social costs that may derive from this inefficiency; (iii) the incompleteness of the insolvency exception (or the financial distress
exception) as a doctrine justifying the need for a directorial duty to creditors; and
(iv) the uncertainty created by a contextualist interpretation of the debt contract.

129. See text reported supra at note 118.
130. No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
131. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
132. This interpretation of the dicta in In re Disney seems also consistent with Chancellor Strine's statement
at n.52: "I assume that, at all times directors have an obligation to consider the legal duties of the firm and to
avoid consciously placing the firm in a position when it will be unable to discharge those duties." Prod. Res.
Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 n.52 (Del. Ch. 2004).
133. The BJR consists of the "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
134. See Ribstein & Alces, supra note 42, at 529 (arguing that the business judgment rule give directors
discretion "not only to decide what actions to take, but in whose interests to act"); Bainbridge, supra note 41
(claiming that the "zone of insolvency doctrine" of directors' duties to creditors is "much ado about very little"
because the business judgment rule would protect directors from creditors' claims in most of these cases).
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To remedy these problems, I propose the adoptions of two legal instruments: a
default duty of directors to creditors and a textualist interpretative regime of the
debt contract.
A.

Debt Contract and Duty to Creditors

The first legal tool that I propose to enhance the debt contract's efficiency is a
default rule of law imposing on directors a duty not to increase unilaterally creditors' accepted risk (CAR). As a default rule of law, the actual scope and content of
the duty would be determined by the parties' negotiation as reflected in the debt
contract. Parties themselves would set the duty's boundaries depending on the level
of risk they agree upon in the debt contract. "' 5 In this sense, I offer a new contractarian perspective of directors' duty to creditors. As advocated by contractarians, under the model I suggest, directors' obligations to creditors are determined by
contract. The existence of a default duty, however, attempts to remedy the debt
contract's inefficiency that the contractarian analysis neglects to consider; namely,
the contract's inadequacy to govern the managerial opportunism problem and to
serve as a credible signal on corporate risk.
1.

The Functions Served by the Duty to Creditors

The basic working assumption underlying the existence of the proposed duty to
creditors is that managers are the parties in the best position to evaluate the hidden
options of an investment,'36 including the option to increase the investment's risk
ex post. Nevertheless, to avoid expropriation of creditor value, managers (i.e.,
debtor companies) must pay for the exercise of these options. This requires that
they disclose credible information to creditors. Only in this way can creditors adequately price the option(s) to be purchased by managers (i.e., debtors). Under this
view, the duty, imposing on directors an obligation not to increase the CAR ex post,
would make them personally liable to creditors for failing to disclose relevant information and exercise options that they have not bought. This would serve two distinct, but closely related functions. First, making directors liable also to creditors,
the duty would realign the asymmetry intrinsic to the geometry of corporate debt.
Second, it would remedy the negative externalities arising out of SPR and MECS
and, therefore, make the debt contract a credible signal on corporate risk.
Being the duty determined by contract, any violation of the contractual provisions on the CAR would also constitute a breach of the duty.'37 Therefore, the duty
would induce managers to fulfill the contract. Indeed, the imposition of personal
losses for the duty's breach would discourage managers from undertaking courses
135. For a practical example of what this would entail, see infra Part III.D.
136. See Part II.A.2 for a discussion on the option theory analysis of corporate projects.
137. Provided that, as it will be discussed in more details thereinafter, the breach of the CAR provisions also
results in a default on payment. See infra Part III.C.
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of actions that maximize share value by expropriating creditor value. In other
terms, the duty would deter managerial opportunism by serving as a bonding
mechanism giving directors incentives to stay in the contract. "' This, in turn,
would lead to a reduction of monitoring costs. Being able to rely on the incentives
provided by the duty, creditors would need to spend less to verify the debtor's (i.e.,
the directors') compliance with the credit agreement's provisions. In addition, being that monitoring costs are translated on the debtor through an increase of the
interest rate, their reduction would also lead to a decrease of the cost of capital.
The second function served by the duty would be to transform the debt contract
into a credible signal on corporate risk,'39 thereby enabling the credit market to
screen firms on the basis of their marginal risk. 40 First, the bonding mechanism
provided by the duty would make the investment policy restrictions creditors negotiate more effective in governing the investment's underlying risk. In other terms,
the duty would make the debt contract a more adequate instrument to deter managerial opportunism.' 4' Second, the liability threat determined by the duty would
induce creditors to deem credible the information disclosed by managers. Knowing
that directors bear personal losses for the duty's breach, creditors would indeed be
more likely to rely on such information. As a result, the credit market would become better able to price the investment's underlying risk. This means that it could
138. The incentive function served by the duty to creditors would be consistent with a basic theoretical
result in the economics of agency: Holmstrom's finding that making agents accountable for events over which
they have no control does not solve the moral hazard problem. By making managers accountable over an event
that they control, i.e., the contract's fulfilment, the duty's existence would instead remedy the managerial
opportunism problem. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.ECON. 74, 89--90 (1979).
139. This is consistent with Ross's discussion on the incentive-signaling model. For Ross, if there is uncertainty in the market and one firm cannot be distinguished from the other, returns for each firm become
conditional on exogenous information. Therefore, absent a credible signal, all firms will be considered of the
same value (instead of being attributed a value corresponding to the firm's discounted cash flows as it happens
in conditions of certainty). To stick with the good firm/bad firm distinction I have previously proposed, this
means that all firms will be considered as potential bad firms. Ross argues that "[olne way to break out of the
constraint that binds the value of ...firms is to assume a significant role for the manager." Ross, supra note 13,
at 27. For him, managerial accountability would be "a means of validating financial signals" which would
otherwise be useless to differentiate one firm from the other due to moral hazard and adverse selection
problems. Id.Similarly, a duty imposing a personal liability of directors to creditors is a means to transform the
debt contract in a credible signal to distinguish good firms from bad firms. Cf also Lars A. Stole, The Economics
of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J. L. EcoN. & ORG., 582,
584 (1992) (arguing that, when parties have asymmetric information, liquidated damage clauses may be used
to communicate valuable information and move from a pooling to a separating equilibrium); Robert Forsythe,
Russell Lundholm & Thomas Rietz, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in FinancialMarkets: Some Experimental Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 481, 486 (1999) (arguing that an antifraud rule, punishing sellers who
make false statements as to the quality of their products, constitutes a way to give the "seller a means to credibly
communicate its quality").
140. As to the limits of the debtor's posting of security or grant of guarantees as alternative instruments to
induce creditors' screening, see supra Part l.B.2.b. Cf also Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV 1396, 1415-17 (1997) (denying that an inefficient pooling equilibrium would
apply as to secured and unsecured borrowers).
141. The duty would make the debt contract adequate to govern the risk of the projects that the corporation will undertake. See supra Part l.B.2.d.
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price debt on the basis of the debt contract's information and provisions rather
than through a pooling mechanism. Indeed, by offering to creditors a liability rule
that does not appeal to bad firms,' 42 good firms' directors would allow the credit
market to break.4 3 Thus, assuming competitive markets, the credit market could
move from a pooling equilibrium, in which debt is priced on the basis of the average risk increase, to separating equilibria, in which debt's price is determined on
the basis of firms' specific risk.'
2. Why a Default Rule of Law Imposing a Directors' Duty to Creditors Would Be
Desirable'45
Before discussing the second legal tool I propose, a crucial question needs to be
addressed. Why is a default rule of law necessary to remedy the described inefficiency of the debt's contract? If the scheme I advocate is truly efficient, why would
parties not establish a liability of directors through private contracting under existing law?
A first answer to such question is that parties, under the current model of corporate fiduciary duties, could not bargain for a liability rule of directors to creditors
as the one I propose. According to the dominant opinion of both legal scholars and
justices, corporate law would provide for a mandatory fiduciary model.'46 Under
such a model, directors owe their duties to the exclusive benefit of shareholders
when the company is solvent and to creditors when the company becomes insolvent. "' Thus, parties would have very limited room to contract around the legal
arrangement of their rights and duties."'
The above consideration, however, does not represent the major reason for imposing a default rule of law creating a directors' duty to creditors. In fact, I share
the idea of those who, contrary to the popular wisdom, claim that the corporate

142. Good firms' directors would offer their personal liability to creditors in the sense that they decide to
not opt out of the default liability rule. See infra Part III.A.2.
143. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 238 (arguing that the "informed side of a market is likely to introduce or
accept distortions in contracting so as to signal attributes that are attractive to uninformed side of the market
.... [A] good borrower will try to demonstrate attractive prospects to the investors by introducing distortions
that are costly to her, but that would be even costlier to a bad borrower."). See also SPENCE, supra note 15,
passim; Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. EcoN. 629 (1976); Charles Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets
with Incomplete Information, 16 J. EcoN. THEORY 167 (1977).
144. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1416 (arguing that as long as unsecured borrowers could disclose
information to creditors a pooling interest rate would not apply).
145. 1 wish to give special thanks to Professor Henry Hansmann for the insights provided on this part of
the essay and the year-long discussion we have had on the matter.
146. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. The only exception is represented by the possibility of contracting exculpatory clauses for the managers' duty of care. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary model has a permissive, rather than a mandatory nature.'49 Under this
view, fiduciary duties could be modified by contract. In particular, parties would
be "free to make deals that carve into the fiduciary rights of shareholders, ' 1 ° i.e.,
they could modify the shareholder primacy rule. Nevertheless, I argue that a default
rule of law imposing a duty to creditors would still be desirable. There are several
reasons for this. First, both creditors and directors would have no incentives to
bargain privately for the personal liability of directors. Second, the existence of
such a default rule would reduce the transaction costs parties bear to achieve the
efficient outcome. Third, a model in which parties may opt out of the duty would
induce directors to disclose more information than a model in which parties must
negotiate for it.
My first claim as to the desirability of a default duty to creditors concerns the
position of creditors and directors. Indeed, one could argue that there is no need
for the law to supplement the terms of the debt contract in the fashion I propose.
Creditors could buy out directors' liability, and the same efficient outcome would
follow. On the contrary, I argue that creditors would not incur additional transaction costs to bargain privately for a directors' duty to their benefit. As previously
discussed, anticipating the inefficiency of the debt contract in governing the managerial opportunism risk, creditors price debt on the basis of the average risk.'' As a
matter of financial theory, creditors' payoffs are the same under a pooling or separating equilibrium.'52 Thus, they have no incentives to bargain for a rule which
would induce the credit market to price debt on the basis of firms' specific risk.' 53
Once again, however, the above argument is not decisive. Although creditors
would not have incentives to bargain privately for the duty I propose, one could
always argue that, if there are prospective efficiency gains, directors themselves
could negotiate their personal liability with creditors. Although they are formally
third parties to the credit agreement between corporation and creditors," 4 directors
could intervene in such agreement as guarantors of the CAR provisions. Yet, it
seems unlikely that directors would act in this way. To begin with, a collective
negotiation by the board seems very difficult; most likely directors would negotiate
individually, with a serious risk of board's disruption."' In addition, because directors would not benefit directly from the efficiency gains the existence of the duty

149. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 25; Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra note 25; Macey,
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 25.
150. Macey, FiduciaryDuties, supra note 25, at 1281.
151. See supra Part I.B.2.e.
152. For a general but rigorous treatment of the microeconomics of the matter, see MAS-COLELL ET. AL.,
supra note 15, at 462.
153. See Cadsby et al., supra note 75 (empirically proving that, in financial markets, the pooling equilibrium is dominating when theory permits both pooling and separating equilibria).
154. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
155. Indeed, in the case of individual negotiation of directors' liability to creditors, there would be the risk
that only the more reckless directors would agree to become guarantors of the CAR provisions.
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would produce, they would have no incentives to incur additional liability unless
they were compensated by the shareholders.156
From this perspective, then, the ultimate question is whether shareholders would
bargain for the duty. Assuming a competitive credit market, good firms' shareholders could be incentivized to bargain for the duty to induce the market to break. I
claim, however, that the transaction costs shareholders would incur to bargain privately for the duty would risk overcoming the efficiency gains arising from its existence. According to the Coase theorem," 7 in a world of symmetric information and
zero transaction costs, there would be no need for a default rule imposing a duty of
directors to creditors. Regardless of the initial distribution of legal entitlements,
parties would be able to remedy privately negative externalities arising under the
current corporate governance system. In the real world, however, the debtor-creditor relationship is characterized both by high transaction costs and asymmetric
information.'58 Hence, the initial distribution of legal entitlements does matter to
enhance efficiency. From this perspective, I argue that it would be cheaper for the
shareholders to opt out of a duty to creditors than to bargain for it.
Because of the described geometry of corporate debt, to opt in the duty, shareholders should engage in a complex and expensive negotiation with both creditors
and managers. They should negotiate the scope of the duty, i.e., the single CAR
provisions, with creditors and then have managers to accept liability for any of
these provisions and negotiate with the managers the extra compensation required
to cover the liability risk. This would increase transaction costs. In addition,
whereas opting out of the duty might be easily done through a single sentence,
specifying it by contract could only be done through a complex and detailed set of
contractual specifications, which could be assessed only at a great cost. Hence, a
default rule should be imposed because it would actually be cheaper to bargain
around it than it would be to bargain for it.' 59
One last reason would justify the imposition of a default rule of law establishing
a duty to creditors. Under the model I suggest, as it will be discussed in detail
156. In the case managers hold an equity stake, the discussion is substituted by the following paragraph on
the shareholders' position.
157. The Coase theorem relates to the economic efficiency of the initial allocation of property rights. See R.
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 1. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960). In essence, the theorem states that in the
absence of transaction costs, all initial allocations of property are equally efficient, because interested parties
will bargain privately to correct any externality. See id. As a corollary, the theorem also implies that in the
presence of transaction costs, inefficiency may be minimized by allocating property initially to the party assigning it the greatest utility. See id.
158. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
159. Cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,89 MICH.
L. REv. 1815, 1842-43 (1991). Charny argues that, in establishing the best default, one should consider the
costs that would be incurred from each possible contractual specification of the term (i.e., the costs incurred to
opt in the term) and choose the term that minimizes the net costs of transacting. See id. From this perspective,
it would be right to "choose a term that would actually be desired in relatively few transactions if it is much
cheaper to bargain around that term than it would be for the few parties who want that term to bargain for it
(or to submit to the terms that others want or to not transact)." Id. at 1842.
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thereinafter, 6 ° directors would reveal information to creditors both when they accept the liability regime, through the specification of the duty's scope and content,
and when they decide to opt out of such a regime. Indeed, opting out of the duty
would have an intrinsic informational meaning, which creditors would consider in
pricing debt. On the contrary, in a regime in which parties must bargain privately
for the duty, directors would reveal information only if they opted in the duty. If
they decided not to bargain privately for it, no additional information would be
revealed. The result would be that the current inefficiency of the debt contract
would not be solved and that there would not be credible signals on corporate risk.
B.

The Need for a Textualist InterpretativeRule

The second legal instrument I propose to redress the current inefficiency of debt
contracts is a textualist interpretative rule mandating to consider accepted by creditors any risk that they have not contractually excluded or limited. The adoption of
such a rule would have a two-fold purpose. First, it would serve to induce both
parties to specify the contract. Second, it would eliminate the possibility of ex post
completion of the debt contract (and of the duty) by the third adjudicator, thereby
reducing uncertainty in legal relationships.
1. Textualist Interpretation and Contract Specification
I have claimed above that, assuming competitive markets, the existence of a managerial duty to creditors would make the debt contract a credible signal as to corporate risk. 6' This, in turn, would induce the credit market to move from a pooling
equilibrium to separating equilibria. From this perspective, the first reason justifying the imposition of a textualist interpretative rule would be to give parties additional incentives, besides those arising from the duty, to write more statecontingent contracts. Indeed, because creditors' payoffs in pooling or separating
equilibria are the same,'62 if we relax the competitive market assumption, the duty
to creditors, by itself, might be a weak instrument to change the current mechanism of debt pricing. Thus, a textualist interpretative rule would serve to give also
to creditors the right incentives to specify the contract.
Before illustrating in detail the proposed interpretative rule, some preliminary
considerations as to the risk accepted by creditors needs to be drawn. First, it must
be observed that creditors always accept the investment's systematic risk, 163 which
they automatically discount at the conclusion of the debt contract. Hence, directors
never owe creditors a duty as to this type of risk. To say otherwise, would mean
requiring directors to guarantee the repayment of creditors' claims, which is not the
160.
161.
162.
163.
known

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.A.2.
The systematic risk is the risk inherent to the entire market (or entire market segment). It is also
as un-diversifiable risk or market risk.
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purpose of the proposed duty. Thus, creditors who finance a car manufacturing
company always accept (and discount) the risk of failure determined by a car industry crisis. This means that creditors cannot sue directors for the company's default due to such circumstances. Similarly, creditors accept the specific risk of
failure; for instance, the risk that the car manufacturing company may default on
payment because of the poor sales of a new line of cars. Unlike the case of the
systematic risk, however, creditors can adjust the investment's specific risk by contract.'64 For instance, the creditors of the car-manufacturing company could negotiate an investment policy restriction against the undertaking of new lines of
business. By so doing, they would rule out the risk that the directors may decide to
reconvert the company's production into aircraft manufacturing and fail to repay
the debt because of this undertaking. Thus, when I say that parties themselves
would set the scope and content of the duty to creditors by negotiating a certain
investment's risk, I always refer to the investment's specific risk.
Having clarified this, my basic claim is that a textualist interpretative rule, together with the duty's existence, would prompt Nash bargaining 6 ' between directors and creditors ultimately leading to an optimal level of specification of the debt
contract.' 66 Although the incomplete contract approach to contract theory'67 correctly teaches that specification is expensive, I have previously explained that also
writing low state-contingent contracts (that is contracts including mostly general
covenants) may prove very expensive. When contracts are drafted in this way, not
only do parties bear an high opportunity cost, but also an increased cost of debt
because creditors anticipate that such contracts are less likely to constrain managerial opportunism. 6
The Nash bargaining between the parties would work approximately in this way.
Because the textualist interpretative rule would mandate to consider that creditors
accepted any specific risk that they have not ruled out (or otherwise limited), it
would give creditors incentives to specify the contract. In fact, as to creditors, the
proposed interpretative rule would work as a penalty default, that is, as a rule "designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the

164. As long established under the CAPM theory, devised by Stanford Professor William Sharpe and
Harvard Professor John Lintner, an alternative way in which creditors may limit the specific risk they bear is
through the diversification of their investments. See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection
of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and CapitalBudgets, 47 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 13 (1965); William F. Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 426 (1964). The
incentive scheme provided by the CAPM model, however, would not promote contractual efficiency. Under
such a theory, creditors have indeed no incentives to expend resources to write better contracts, because they
can diversify their risk away simply by investing in different classes of capital assets.
165. See Nash, Equilibrium Points, supra note 16; Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, supra note 16.
166. By optimal level of specification, I intend that level in which the marginal cost of specifying an additional contractual provision equals the marginal cost parties might bear if they do not specify such a provision.
167. In accordance with the incomplete contract approach, contract writing costs are positive and may be
too high to permit the parties to contract on all foreseeable contingencies. See Schwartz, supra note 14.
168. See supra Parts 1.B.2.d., l.B.2.e.
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default [ ] and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer."' ' Yet, as to directors, the proposed interpretative rule might seem to induce
the former to conceal, rather than disclose information. By so acting, directors
would maintain that creditors accept even the risk inherent to the undisclosed information. Indeed, not being aware of such a risk, creditors could not rule it out.
This, in turn, not only would limit the area of directors' liability, but also reserve
them further investment options at no additional cost. On the contrary, I argue
that the rule would give incentives to specify the contract also to directors. To
understand why, consider this negotiating sequence.
Stage 1: At the parties' kick-off meeting, the managers, seeking to reserve additional investment options, illustrate a rather generic business plan to creditors. Being aware that they are presumed to accept any risk that is not limited by contract,
creditors will then seek to impose restrictions on the firm's investment policy.
Lacking credible information on the actual risk of the investment, however, they
will demand general covenants. Being low state-contingents on the external state
(i.e., the corporate activity), in a textualist interpretative regime, 70 such covenants
ban a large set of investment opportunities. Hence, under the proposed model, the
ultimate result of the information-hiding behavior adopted by managers would be
to broaden rather than restrict the area of their personal liability to creditors.
Stage 2: At the next meeting, rational managers will then attempt to narrow their
liability's risk. They will thus ask for some modifications of the general covenants
demanded by creditors. In order to obtain such modifications, however, they will
be forced to disclose credible information to creditors. As a result of this interaction, the contract the parties would finally write would be as state-contingent as
possible.' 7' The availability of credible information on the investment's risk would
have them to negotiate for detailed contractual provisions, which would be effective
in preventing managerial opportunism without imposing excessive restrictions on
the firm's investment policy. The described negotiation scheme should, in fact, induce parties to write contracts as state-contingent as to minimize the aggregate cost
2
of (i) the interest rate applied to corporate debt;1
(ii) the firm's opportunity cost;
73
and (iii) the expected directors' liability cost.

169. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91. The term penalty default was first coined by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. See id.
170. See supra note 65.
171. Cf. Smith & Warner, supra note 39, at 129-146 (arguing that, for each firm, would exist a unique
optimal set of protective covenants that maximize the value of the firm).
172. Besides the incentives arising out of the imposition of the duty to creditors and the textualist interpretative regime, directors would be induced to disclose information to avoid the imposition of excessively high
interest rates. Where creditors were completely uninformed as to the risk affecting the debtor company, they
would presumably charge an interest rate so high that good firms' directors could be forced to make different
choices as to the corporate capital structure.
173. From this perspective, the proposed model also takes into account the complete contract approach to
contract theory. In contrast to the incomplete contract approach, the latter teaches that parties can write highly
state-contingent contracts, but some contingencies could not be verified by the third adjudicator. (For a brief

VOL. 1 NO. 2 2007

DIRECTORS' DUTY TO CREDITORS AND THE DEBT CONTRACT

The proposed model would, thus, maximize the utility of both parties. Debtors
would benefit from a reduction of both the interest rate applied to debt and the
opportunity cost, because creditors would become better able to price the investment's underlying risk. Creditors, on the other hand, would be ex ante compensated for the investment's hidden options that managers intend to exercise, because
they would have sufficient information at their disposal to price such hidden options and adjust the cost of debt accordingly.
2.

Textualist Interpretation and Enforcement of the Duty to Creditors

A regime of textualist interpretation would also mandate to read restrictively the
contractual provisions that specify creditors' accepted risk (i.e., the CAR provisions). This means that, as pointed out by Professor Schwartz together with Professor Scott, contractual clauses should be interpreted on a narrow evidentiary base,
which essentially includes solely the contract itself.'74 Moreover, it should also be
assumed that these clauses are written in the majority talk, i.e., in the "language
that people typically use when communicating with each other."' 5
Contractual terms should be read restrictively because contracting parties have
more and better information on the substantive terms of their exchange than any
other party.'76 For this reason, they are in the best position to assess the relative
costs and benefits of their relationship and allocate contractual rights so to maximize the value of their exchange.' It follows that any contractual interpretation
not conforming to the letter of the contract would risk altering the distribution of

discussion on the meaning of unverifiable information, see infranote 176). To solve this problem, under the
proposed model, parties could play with the cost individuated in the text. In particular, to avoid the opportunity cost implied by less contingent covenants, which would be the natural response to unverifiable information, the debtor could well offer to pay a higher interest rate. From this perspective, extra spread on the interest
portion and contractual rights, in the case of non verifiable information, could be regarded as substitute goods
for the creditors.
174. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 572. More specifically, Schwartz and Scott individuate the evidentiary base to be allowed in a strict textualist approach in: (i) the contract, (ii) an English language dictionary,
and (iii) the interpreter's experience and understanding of the world. See id.
175. Id. at 570.
176. Not only some of the parties' information would not be observable by the third adjudicator, but, even
when observable, it would not be verifiable. This means that the third adjudicator could observe the information but could not verify its existence at reasonable costs and with reasonable accuracy. As a result, the adjudicator would be unable to enforce parties' obligations on the basis of such information. See Eggleston et al.,
supra note 14, at 119-20. (Eggleston et al. considers the case of a long-term contract for the delivery of some
perishable goods, in which the parties agree that the goods to be delivered must be of some standard quality. At
a certain point the buyer refuses the goods, claiming that their quality is substandard. By the time the court
settles the dispute, the court will most likely be unable to verify the quality of the goods because of their
perishable nature. And, even if the goods had not yet perished, a court might not be able to distinguish a good
of standard quality from one of substandard quality due to lack of specific expertise.) On the utility of the
proposed model to solve the problem of unverifiable information, see supra note 173.
177. See sources cited supra note 17. See also, Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism in Relational Contract,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 864-65 (2000).
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rights agreed upon by the parties and, in turn, reducing the expected value of their
exchange.17
Indeed, if the CAR could be determined on the basis of the courts' subjective
interpretation of the parties' intentions, courts themselves, rather than parties,
would (re)determine the duty's scope and content. This would lead to a managerial
policy of underinvestment. In fact, managers would be so concerned over the possibility of a judicial error in the duty's determination that they would avoid taking
risk altogether. And because corporations need to take risks to prosper, this would
jeopardize the maximization of corporate welfare.'79
Under a textualist interpretative regime, understanding whether directors have
increased creditors' accepted risk ex post requires essentially an analysis of the CAR

provisions. Because creditors accept any risk they do not contractually exclude or
limit, directors can be held liable to creditors only if they violate one of these
clauses. In this sense, the breach of a CAR provision would be a necessary condition for the enforcement of the duty to creditors. It would not also be a sufficient
condition, however. To be able to claim directors' liability, creditors should also be
damaged by the conduct of directors. For instance, suppose that a restrictive covenant prohibits firm A from investing in project x, which creditors consider too
risky. Regardless of the covenant's provision, the company's directors decide to
invest in the project. Project x, however, performs well and the company is able to
meet its payment obligations. In such a case, although the company would be liable
to creditors for breach of the contract, directors would not.
Under this view, it would be necessary to draw a distinction between two different kinds of contractual clauses. On the one side, there would be the CAR provisions, fixing the risk accepted by creditors; on the other, the provisions setting the
terms of repayment of debt. The violation of just one type of contractual provision
would not entail the breach of the duty to creditors. Directors could not be held
liable when the default on payment is not due to the violation of the CAR. In the
same way, directors would not be liable when the violation of the CAR is not
followed by a default on payment. Only if a payment obligation was violated following the breach of a CAR provision would directors be liable to creditors. Indeed,
even if creditor value could be depreciated before the actual default on payment,
giving creditors the right to enforce the duty prior to the occurrence of such an
event would create uncertainty. To establish ex ante (i.e., before a payment default)
whether the depreciation of creditors' claims was determined by the breach of the
duty (i.e., of the CAR provisions), rather than by some macro-economic variable,

178. See, e.g., Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 17, at 317; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 549.
179. In addition, parties could exploit the risks implied by the third adjudicator's ex post completion of the
debt contract and engage in strategic behaviors. Because, under the current regime, the uncertainty surrounding legal procedures would induce creditors to prefer out of court settlements, borrowers might attempt to
profit from this tendency to seek to extort more favorable contract terms. See Chen & Wei, supra note 68, at
223-31.
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would, in fact, be very difficult. Yet, in such an event, creditors could still trigger
the contract for breach of the CAR provision and seek compensation from the
corporation.
C. Exemption from Liability
Under the proposed model, directors would have several options to negotiate an
exemption from liability. First, they could negotiate exculpatory clauses from liability. This does not mean that directors could undertake any kind of project they
might like. The debt contract could (and, most likely, will) still impose limits on
the management of the firm's investment policy. The negotiation of exculpatory
clauses would simply imply that directors could not be held liable to creditors in
the case where an investment decision resulted in the breach of a contractual covenant on the CAR (and, contextually, in a default on payment). In addition, under
the proposed model, should directors want to reserve further options to increase
the level of risk agreed upon in the debt contract, they would have two alternatives
at their disposal. They could bargain for a contractual right either to renegotiate
the credit agreement's terms8 ° or to exit the relationship by refinancing the outstanding debt.
This set of options to avoid liability would not impair the system of incentives
provided by the proposed model as to the disclosure of information. To begin with,
in seeking exculpatory clauses, managers would still disclose information. As anticipated,' 8' opting out of the duty would have an intrinsic informational meaning.
Indeed, as managers opting in the duty would allow the market: to break by offering
contractual terms that do not appeal to bad firms, managers opting out of it would
allow the market to break by refusing to offer creditors such contractual terms. 82 In
turn, creditors would evaluate and price the project's risk also on the basis of the
directors' request for an exculpatory clause. Similarly, in order to renegotiate contractual terms for engaging in riskier corporate projects, directors would be also
forced to reveal information." 3 From this perspective, the disclosure policy implied
by the renegotiation of the contract's terms would work as a typical dissipative
signal conveying (additional) information on the quality of the firm's claims and

180. When managers bargain a contractual right to renegotiation, they practically reserve an option to
negotiate for future options. More simply, the parties agree they will agree. From this perspective, the debt
contract's function becomes that of providing general criteria regulating the future negotiation of the parties.
In optional language, the contract fixes the criteria establishing how future options should be priced.
181. See supra Part III.A.2.
182. See supra note 143.
183. From this perspective, the duty would also reduce the risk of strategic behaviors of the parties during
renegotiation. Absent the bonding mechanism offered by the duty, instead, creditors would not be able to
renegotiate intelligently because of the problems discussed in Part l.B.2.d. and because they could not adequately estimate the value of the riskier project(s) that managers want to undertake. On this latter problem, see
Myers, supra note 39, at 158.
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management.' 4 In particular, although soft information might be easy to manipulate, the dissipative signal function served by the disclosure policy mechanism just
described should also work for this kind of information. By making managers directly liable to creditors, the duty should lead creditors to deem disclosed information credible even when such information is not directly verifiable, i.e., it is soft.'
The proposed model of exemption from liability would also not jeopardize the
firm's interest in secrecy. Consider, for instance, the interests of a mining company
wanting to explore international opportunities. Further assume that the company's
management also wants to buy a mine in a risky place, which itself is a high variance investment. The managers, however, do not want to disclose this latter piece
of information, because it could tip off other bidders. In such a circumstance, managers will thus face a trade-off between the value of keeping this information secret
and the reduced cost of debt following the disclosure of such information. As explained above, if managers decide not to disclose accurate information, creditors
might react in two ways. They might ask for more general covenants, which translate in a higher opportunity cost, or they might negotiate a higher interest rate to
be covered against the risk they believe managers have not disclosed. Then, it will
be up to managers, who are in the best position to take such a decision, to evaluate
whether it is more convenient to opt for disclosure or bear a higher cost of debt.
D. The Mechanics of the Duty and its Possible Conceptualization
The ultimate purpose of the proposed model is to try to make contracting parties
able to devise the best allocation between investment's risk and policy restrictions
(i.e., opportunity and monitoring costs) so as to maximize the ex ante value of their
exchange. To this end, contracting parties would determine privately what scope
the duty should have. For instance, they could provide for a different scope of the
duty depending on the financial conditions of the company. They could establish
that, until the company is a going concern, directors could pursue any kind of
investment they like. When the company starts to experience financial distress, instead, directors could be held to the respect of some predetermined financial parameters.' 6 With the same logic, contracting parties could agree that directors
could pursue risky projects even when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency. The question would simply be how much creditors would ask to sell this
kind of option (i.e., to bear the higher risk that this option implies). Under this
view, the set of liability exemptions described above would serve as additional con184. See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 249 (stating the adverse selection problems arising out of asymmetry of
information can be reduced "through disclosure to investors of information about the firm's prospects").
185. Id. at 249-50. See also sources cited supra note 39.
186. The idea here is that, as long as the company is a going concern with very liquid financial resources,
creditors could even agree in the contract for the absurd; for example, creditors could agree that managers are
free to gamble the company's money at the casino. Yet, once the company starts experiencing financial distress,
the same managers could no longer make an investment choice of this kind but would be held to the respect of
some predetermined financial parameters.
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tractual instruments the parties would have at their disposal to devise the best
allocation of their interests.
It follows that directors of financially distressed firms should no longer be concerned as to the actual beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties or the undertaking of
excessively risky corporate projects. Regardless of the financial conditions of the
corporation, directors would be free to pursue whatever strategy they might deem
beneficial, as long as they (i) respect the CAR; or (ii) bargain for exculpatory
clauses from liability; or (iii) engage in re-negotiation of the agreement's terms (or
buy-out such a right). As a result, directors' discretion in the firm's management
would increase. In addition, the proposed model would also exclude that the fear of
liability's exposure might7 impair managers' decision-making when their resolute
8
action is most needed.
Under this view, the insolvency exception would no longer apply. The duty to
creditors would not shift upon corporate insolvency or financial distress, but be
determined by the parties at the conclusion of the debt contract. Indeed, not only
do I claim that the insolvency exception is an incomplete doctrine of the duty to
creditors, but also that it risks being misleading. It is incomplete because, as previously discussed,' it neglects that directors' incentives to behave opportunistically
arise in the same moment in which the company incurs indebtedness. It risks being
misleading because it implies that directors owe the same duties to shareholders
and creditors. This creates uncertainty and exacerbates the intrinsic conflict between these two classes of stakeholders. In fact, this proposal does not impose on
directors any obligation to maximize creditor value,8 9 but the different one of respecting the investment's risk agreed upon in the debt contract by the parties'
themselves.
1. A Basic Taxonomy
Three basic scenarios could be individuated as to the contractual determination of
the duty to creditors:

187. This was one of the main critiques raised against the vicinity of insolvency standard proposed in the
CreditLyonnais decision. See, e.g., Rao etal., supra note 97 (adducing empirical evidence to confirm that, under
the vague Credit Lyonnais regime, directors of financially troubled companies would prefer to terminate their
office rather than face the liability's exposure). For this reason, nearly-insolvent companies would risk going
"bare" in the moment in which they need the resolute action of their managers most. In addition, even when
directors decide to stay, "[tihe prospect of such [al poorly defined, potentially large liability could chill directors' exercise of their business judgment when confronted with difficult choices." Id. at 66. As a result, directors
"may feel constrained to make overly-conservative decisions when they are unsure whether their corporation is
in the 'vicinity of insolvency."' Id. In similar terms, see McDonnell et al., supra note 90, at 180 (arguing that
"[d]irectors . . . . fearing the imposition of personal liability, may be hesitant to accept or remain in their
positions").
188. See supra Part II.A.1.
189. As previously discussed, this would lead to a policy of underinvestment which would ultimately compromise the maximization of corporate welfare. See supra Part I.B.1.
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(i) on a (purely) theoretical level, the debt contract could be silent as to the risk
accepted by creditors, meaning that it might contain no positive or negative covenants. In this case, directors would be free to pursue any project they may like.
Under the proposed regime of textualist interpretation of the debt contract, creditors would be presumed to have accepted any kind of risk. The interest rate applied
to the debt, in turn, will reflect such an arrangement of the parties' relationship. In
accordance with this proposal, in fact, the market should have enough information
to price this kind of specific risk and demand an adequate compensation;
(ii) the debt contract could specify the level of risk accepted by creditors and,
therefore, set the scope of the duty. In this case, the duty would have the effect to
supplement the obligations undertaken by the company, as subscriber of the debt
contract, with a side obligation of directors. More analytically, the duty, making
directors liable also to creditors and serving as a bonding mechanism to fulfill the
contract, would solve the above-described asymmetry intrinsic to the geometry of
corporate debt. Because under the proposed model, directors would be liable to
creditors for breach of the CAR provisions, they would no longer be incentivized to
undertake corporate projects that pursue the shareholders' interests in violation of
the letter of the contract, because they would personally bear the cost of such a
contractual breach;
(iii) the debt contract could specify the level of risk accepted by creditors, but at
the same time establish an exculpatory clause for directors' liability to creditors. In
this case, as in the first, directors could never be held liable for the duty's breach. In
the first case, however, both the directors and the company would be exempted
from liability; here, instead, the company would still be liable to creditors for
breach of contract. In other terms, by opting for this kind of contractual arrangement, parties would go back to the current regime, but to do this they should
disclose additional information.
2. A Possible Conceptualizationof the Duty
Although attempting to re-conceptualize the proposed duty to creditors is a task
which will require much more investigation than that carried out so far, I will try
to outline some preliminary ideas on the matter. My basic claim is that, pursuant
to the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of good faith recently advanced by the
Production Resources and the Disney decisions, 9 ° the proposed duty could be subsumed under such a fiduciary paradigm. In accordance with the Production Resources opinion, the duty could well be read as sanctioning the lack of (vertical)
good faith in the fulfillment of directors' obligations which arise from the debt
contract. Similarly, consistently with Disney, one could say that the proposed duty
sanctions directors' intentional failure to fulfill their known duties deriving from
the debt contract.
190.

See supra Part II.B.1.
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From this perspective, creditors should be considered indirect beneficiaries of
the duty, which would run to the corporation. This would also be consistent with
the court's decision in Production Resources, which has advocated a return to the
traditional corporate law view of the corporate entity as the ultimate beneficiary of
directors' fiduciary duties 9 ' (and, consequently, also claimed the derivative nature
of creditors' rights). Although not all commentators share this view,92 most have
welcomed this formulation of the duties.'93 Nevertheless, unlike in Production Resources, where the creditors' right to bring action against directors is determined by
corporate insolvency, under the model I envisage, the violation of the CAR provisions would trigger creditors' rights. This would solve the problem of the co-existence between managerial duties to creditors and shareholders. Directors' decisionmaking would not be complicated by the fact that they owe duties both to creditors
and shareholders, because, in the proposed textualist interpretative regime, their
duty to the former would be limited to what was established by the debt contract.
E. The Distinction between Capital Providers and Other Fixed Claimants
Although the discussion on the proposed duty has so far referred generally to corporate creditors, not all the firm's fixed claimants would actually need being attributed such a duty. Essentially, by corporate creditors, I mean the firm's capital
providers. In their case, the attribution of the duty would be justified by the need
of modifying the current distribution of legal entitlements so to enable parties to
write better contracts. In the case of other fixed claimants, instead, the law would
already attribute express rights to solve the potential inefficiency arising from the
creditors' relationship with the corporation.'94 Labor law, for instance, is the legal
instrument designed to solve the inefficiency of the employment contract. Thus,
minimum wage, safety, plant-closing, unemployment compensation, and other labor laws' provide substantial protection to the interests of employees and, more
generally, ensure that they can write good contracts.
In addition, other fixed claimants' contractual relationship with the corporation
is characterized by a lower "transactional insecurity" than the creditor-debtor relationship.' 96 The latter expression describes the situation that may arise when the
191. See supra note 25. The view identifying the corporation as ultimate beneficiary of directors' duty used
to be very popular at least until the rise of the contractarian theory of the firm, which, instead, identifies
shareholders as the exclusive beneficiary of the duties.
192. See Bainbridge, Much Ado, supra note 41 (arguing that the approach characterizing the duty of directors as running to the corporate entity rather than any individual constituency is "incoherent in practice and
unsupportable in theory").
193. See Ribstein & Alces, supra note 42; Partnoy, supra note 115, at 45-46.
194. I do not share the view that remedial redundancy would, in fact, not be a problem. See Lipson, supra
note 1, at 1256. 1 argue instead that the overlapping of different causes of action would create uncertainty and,
therefore, compromise efficiency. See also supra Part I.B.I.
195. For instance, employees enjoy a priority right over other creditors' claims in case of bankruptcy.
196. The expression transactional insecurity is borrowed by Professor Kronman. See Anthony T. Kronman,
Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 6 (1985).
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parties' performances take place sequentially. When one party performs before the
other, she may risk that the counterparty may deny her the benefit bargained for in
return. In lender-borrower relationships, this risk is elevated because the lender
carries out in full its side of the exchange before the debtor. In contrast, in the case
of other fixed claimants, like trade creditors, this risk is limited by the fact that they
usually provide their service/goods on a short-term basis.'97 If the debtor defaults
on payment, the creditor can simply stop providing the services or good and, assuming competitive markets, take their business elsewhere.' 98 The credit interest of
employees is even on a shorter basis than that of trade creditors. Thus, always
assuming competitive markets, the transactional insecurity risk faced by employees
is very limited.
Finally, following the reasoning illustrated in the context of the discussion on the
geometry of corporate debt,' 99 creditors who are not capital providers would not
qualify as principal of the corporation. On the contrary, some of them (employees,
for instance) would instead be corporate agents. Under this view, the reasons
above-listed to justify the existence of the duty in favor of creditors that are capital
providers would not apply to other fixed claimants.
1. The Distinction between Bondholders and Other Capital Providers
A further line, then, should be drawn among the same capital providers. Because of
both economic and organizational advantages, banks would be more able than
bondholders to write good debt contracts. In fact, the informational asymmetry
problem would be more pressing in the case of bondholders. This means that, at
the margin, bondholders would benefit more from the attribution of the proposed
duty than would banks. 2"
197. In fact, trade creditors bear a risk of insolvency limited to the payment of the last supply provided to
the firm, and they bear this risk independently from the undertaking by the management of asset substitution
investments. The company managers could simply wake up one day and decide they prefer the goods or
services supplied by another trade creditor. Under this view, the distinction between less and more sophisticated trade creditors would matter to a limited extent. In both cases, the short term of credit would limit the
damage suffered by the creditors. Contra Lipson, supra note 1, at 1248-49.
198. The position of trade creditors, however, should be regarded differently when their relationship with
the corporation has an idiosyncratic nature. By idiosyncratic relationships, I mean those where one of the
parties makes investments that have limited redeployability to alternative uses (i.e., specific investments) and is,
therefore, subject to a significant risk of opportunistic behavior by the counterparty. In fact, trade creditors
may well specialize in providing services/goods that are tailored to a particular corporation. Under these circumstances, then, their position would be assimilable to that of the firm's capital providers. Imagine, for
instance, that a company has a sole supplier and also holds the sole right to its services. The supplier's investment is firm-specific because its services are not recoverable once committed to the company. In such a case,
the same reasons discussed above to justify the exclusion of the duty to trade creditors would impose to grant
it.
199. See supra Part l.B.2.c.
200. It should be noted that when I refer to bondholders I refer, basically, to the holders of privately placed
debt. Indeed, because the default risk of public bonds is usually quite limited, there is commonly little asymmetry of information among markets participants about the value of public bonds. Thus, unlike in the case of
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The basic difference between banks and bondholders is that the latter do not
have the same ability as do banks to obtain and process information."' Banks are
often specialized in providing funds to companies in specific industries, which
gives them a qualified knowledge of the trends and developments in the debtor's
business. Indeed, banks commonly enjoy a permanent organizational structure,
which routinely perform credit analysis of potential borrowers to assess the underlying risk of the investment." 2 In contrast, the dispersive nature of the organizational structure of bondholders raises coordination problems which may impair
their ability to process information and, therefore, to write good debt contracts. As
a result, not only do banks tend to have more information than bondholders, but
they also tend to be in a better position to assess the firm-specific and industryspecific risk. Finally, to obtain information, banks can use economic and political
means that bondholders would not have at their disposal.2 3
Still, it could be argued that the information released in the bond prospectus and
that provided by rating agencies are sufficient to ensure "a fairly high level of disclosure.""2 4 This analysis, however, overstates the quality of the information released to bondholders. Not only does information contained in the bond
prospectus tend to be not so material, 20 ' but it is also doubtful whether information
provided by rating agencies is valuable at all to measure the corporate risk. Contrary to the dominant opinion that "credit rating agencies enhance the capital mar-.
kets infrastructure by distilling a great deal of information ... "206 1 share Professor
Partnoy's view that "credit ratings are of scant informational value."2 7 Several ele-

private placements, the so-called lemon problem, determined by the pooling mechanism of debt pricing, is of
scarce relevance in the case of public bonds.
201. See Triantis, supra note 51, at 309-11 (discussing the importance of banks as financial intermediaries
that yield significant information about firms' activities and financial condition).
202. The elements considered in the credit analysis performed by banks are commonly referred to as the
"five Cs of credit": (i) character of management; (ii) capacity (capability) of management (or the entrepreneur
in closely held corporation); (iii) capital (i.e., capital structure, cash flows statements, liquidity, etc.); (iv) collateral (i.e., the market and liquidation value of the corporate assets); and (v) coverage (i.e., the existence of
insurance against the death or disability of a key person). See TIROLE, supra note 40, at 82.
203. See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1249- 50. See also Triantis, who notes that banks often have representatives
on the boards of their debtors, which does not happen in the case of bondholders. Triantis, supra note 51, at
314.
204. Lipson, supra note 1, at 1250.
205. See Mitchell, Corporate Bondholders, supra note 28, at 1181 n.55 (claiming that "the prospectus more
restates than explains relevant bond terms and is always qualified by reference to the indenture"). Professor
Mitchell also quotes BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 107, for whom bond prospectuses, "like most legal documents. ... review only the conditions and safeguards that exist and do nothing to draw your attention to any
omission or unusual features." Id. at 1181 n.52.
206. Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities: The Role of the Federal
Reserve Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1754, 1762-63 (1998). See also George G.
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive CorporateGovernance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1110
(1995) (arguing that "[ilnformation intermediaries, such as securities analysts or credit rating agencies, facilitate such conventions by decoding ambiguous signals").
207. Frank Partnoy, The Paradoxof Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65-84 (Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, & Carmen M. Reinhart eds., 2002). Professor
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ments would sustain this view. In recent years, there have been multiple defaults
not anticipated by rating agencies.' Similarly, many credit downgrades have occurred only after the rated entity had already showed signs of substantially increased risk.2"9 It seems thus fair to infer that rating agencies are poorly equipped to
predict the corporate risk. This would be even truer in the case of highly-risky
investments (i.e., sub-investment-grade issues), as confirmed by the fact that investors in lower-quality issues tend to rely on other sources of information."' Empirical evidence and numerous academic studies also confirm that rating agencies lag
the market and that the market anticipates rating changes.2 '
From this perspective, the traditional view of credit ratings as screening mechanisms for information unavailable publicly appears difficultly assertable." 2 Quite
on the contrary, credit ratings would be determined on the basis of standard economic indexes, such as the debt-to-equity ratio, liquidity of the existing assets, dividend policy, etc. Indeed, even though the process used to generate ratings includes
meetings with the issuer's representatives," agencies would not be able to extract
from them private information that can prove disadvantageous for the issuer if
released to the public. In addition, even admitting that agencies could obtain all
relevant information, there would still be a credibility problem. Because representaPartnoy has written extensively on the role of credit rating agencies, arguing that the continuing prosperity of
the agencies is best explained by the regulatory dependence on credit ratings rather than by the alleged informational value of the ratings. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down for
the Credit Rating Agencies].
208. Unfortunately, the case of Enron is only the last of a series of unanticipated defaults, involving both
private and public entities. See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 207, at
621 n.8.
209. Id. at 621 n.9 (arguing that the collapse, at the end of the nineties, of Long-Term Capital Management,
the Connecticut hedge-fund that reported losses of $4 billion, "prodded" the major credit rating agencies to
review the credit quality of most U.S. and European banks, and to downgrade one of the banks, Bankers Trust).
210. Id. at 650 (citing Richard House, Ratings Trouble, INSTITUTIONAL INv., Oct. 1995, at 248).
211. See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down for The Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 207, at 647 n.132 (citing,
among others, George Pinches & J. Clay Singleton, The Adjustsment of Stock Prices to Bond Rating Changes, 33
J.FIN. 29, 39 (1978), who carried out a survey on 207 corporate bond rating changes from 1950 to 1972 and
found that most changes merely reflected information already incorporated in stock market). See also JAMES C.
VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MARKET RATES AND FLOWS 191 (3d ed. 1990); Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, Determinants and Impacts of Sovereign Credit Ratings, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. PoL'Y REV., Oct. 1996, at
45-46; Galen Hite & Arthur Warga, The Effect of Bond-Rating Changes on Bond Price Performance, FIN. ANALYSTSJ. May/June 1997, at 35. Partnoy argues that credit spreads (i.e., the difference between the yield on a
particular bond and the yield on a risk-free bond with comparable characteristics and maturity) are more
accurate than credit ratings and denies that credit ratings include additional information not already reflected
in credit spreads. In fact, for Partnoy, credit spread would reflect all available information in the market,
including the rating. From this perspective, he proposes to substitute the current credit rating-based regulation
with credit spread-based regulation. See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down for The Credit Rating Agencies, supra note
207 at 655-62, 704-5. Because credit ratings influence market prices, however, Partnoy's solution risks suffering indirectly from the same problems he aims to overcome.
212. Among the leading financial economists sustaining such a view, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of
"Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283 (1975).
213. See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down forThe Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 207, at 651 n.154 (citing
Richard House, Rating Trouble, INSTITUTIONAL INV., Oct. 1995, Int'l Edition, at 295.).
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tives of higher quality issuers do not have credible signals at their disposal to convey their corporate risk,214 analysts would be unable to distinguish them from
inferior quality issuers. The result is that single rating categories will tend to be
determined on the basis of the average risk rather than the specific risk characterizing firms. Put differently, the single rating category will normally include firms
characterized by different risk profiles. Thus, rather than serving as credible signals
of firms' credit quality and corporate risk,215 credit ratings would to some extent
contribute to the current pooling equilibrium between bad and good firms.
F. Some Policy Considerations
An aspect of this proposal which might raise some difficulties is that of directors'
liability insurance. Indeed, one could argue that directors will most likely seek
some form of coverage against their potential liability to creditors, either requiring
extra compensation or company-funded insurance. 6 In this way, the ultimate cost
of directors' liability would be borne by the company's shareholders. Hence, the
liability threat would no longer serve to redress the inefficiency intrinsic to the
geometry of corporate debt, because once again directors would not have to pay for
creditors' damages out of their own pockets. Although further analysis is required
on the issue, hereinafter I draft some preliminary considerations.
In the first place, I wonder whether such an interest would be insurable. An
insurable interest is, in general, a loss that is not intentionally caused by the insured. Yet, under the textualist interpretative rule that I propose, the duty's breach
could only be triggered by a violation of the debt contract provisions on the CAR
and, as such, be intentionally caused by the directors. Therefore, because only a
policy with an insurable interest at its basis can be purchased and is enforceable, I
wonder how can managers be insured against a risk they have the exclusive power
to trigger.217
Still, should such an interest be insurable, directors' liability insurance would
alter the incentive effects arising out of the duty to creditors only to a limited extent
and not necessarily for the worst. Although they would not bear personal losses for
the duty's breach, directors would still be subject to a significant reputational threat
as a result of the proposed liability rule. Indeed, I do not conceive of directors'
214. This seems especially true as to the risk underlying future corporate projects. See supra note 55 on the
distinction between prospective and retrospective information.
215. See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down for The Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 207, at 631.
216. Company-funded liability insurance seems more likely. Indeed, the increase in the salary compensation that directors would demand if required to pay for the insurance cost would probably be unbearable.
Moreover, the cost of insurance purchased directly by the company would presumably decrease, because of the
higher bargaining power of the firm. See Vanessa Finch, Personal Accountability and CorporateControl: The Role
of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 57 MOD. L. REV. 880 (1994); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857 (1984).
217. Independent directors would represent an exception. Indeed, because directors' liability to creditors
would be of a collegiate nature, the former should always be insurable against such a risk.
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liability as a compensatory means, even though in closely held corporations it
could serve also this function. Instead, the duty's ultimate purposes are to provide a
bonding mechanism inducing directors to fulfill the contract and to serve as a
means incentivizing the disclosure of private information. Should directors have
liability insurance, these basic functions would still be served by the risk of reputational capital depreciation to which directors would be subject for breach of the
duty. Under this view, the reputational capital would most likely be the most important variable insurance companies would consider in pricing directors'
insurance." 8

More interesting, however, is understanding the impact of the possible liability
insurance on the choice of the corporate fiduciary model and capital structure.
Indeed, in devising the best capital structure, managers would take into consideration the tradeoff between the reduced cost of debt determined by the existence of
the duty and the increased cost of equity determined by the liability insurance and
shape their contractual relationships with creditors accordingly. If the increase in
the cost of equity outweighed the reduction of the cost of debt, it is probable that
directors would bargain for exculpatory clauses. On the contrary, if the reduction
of the cost of debt more than compensated for the increase in the cost of equity,
directors (i.e., shareholders) would find it profitable to maintain the liability rule.
Simultaneously, the cost of liability/insurance would influence directors' decisions
as to the firm's optimal capital structure. Indeed, the contractual arrangement
achieved by the parties on directors' liability to creditors might change the proportion of debt and equity capital that maximizes firm value.2"9 From this perspective,
innovative finance could play an important role in devising hybrid financial instruments that would better reflect not only the risk of the underlying assets, but also
the parties' distribution of entitlements and liabilities.22 °
IV.

CONCLUSION

Creditors' rights should be governed by contract. Under the current model of cor-

porate fiduciary law, however, informational asymmetry makes the parties unable
to write debt contracts that govern the managerial opportunism problem effi218. This means that insurance companies would also monitor directors. In turn, the risk of reputational
capital depreciation following the duty's breach would increase.
219. This seems consistent with Smith and Warner's conclusion that "there is an optimal form of the debt
contract, but an optimal amount of debt as well." Smith & Warner, supra note 39, at 154.
220. The problem of the firm's capital structure has been investigated by Oliver Williamson. In his 1988
essay on Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, he points out how assets with high specificity (and high
variance) should be financed through equity;, whereas assets with low specificity (and low variance) through
debt. Economically, this would be explained by the fact that even though debt has a lower cost of capital (being,
inter alia, deductible for tax purposes) than equity, it has a higher marginal cost. From this consideration,
Williamson moves, then, to propose the development of financial instruments gathering the characteristic of
both debt and equity instruments. Under this view, the discourse on the cost of directors' liability versus that of
insurance should also be evaluated in devising financial instruments which reflect the best allocation of debt
and equity. Cf. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567 (1988).
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ciently, i.e., pursuant to a welfare-maximization criterion. This, in turn, leads to the
inefficient allocation of credit capital and to cross-subsidization and adverse selection problems.
To redress the present inefficiency, I suggest the adoption of two legal institutions. First, I propose a default rule of law imposing on directors a duty not to
increase unilaterally the risk accepted by creditors in the debt contract. Second, I
propose a rule of textualist interpretation of the debt contract, mandating to consider accepted by creditors any risk they have not contractually limited or excluded.
Such institutions would serve two basic functions: (i) to enable parties to write
more state-contingent contracts; and (ii) to make the debt contract a credible signal on corporate risk.
By charging directors with personal liability for the ex post increase of the investment's risk negotiated in the contract, the duty would bond managers to stay in the
contract and prevent them from exercising investment options for which they have
not paid. Moreover, making information disclosed by managers credible, the duty
would enable creditors to price debt on the basis of the contract's provisions rather
than by pooling firms in general risk categories. Paired to the duty's existence, a
rule of textualist interpretation would then prompt Nash bargaining between the
parties leading to an optimal level of specification of the debt contract. As to creditors, such a rule would work as a penalty default inducing them to specify to a
greater extent in the contract. As to directors, instead, it would have them to disclose more information so as to avoid the drafting of general covenants that, being
poorly state-contingent, would extend the area of their liability to creditors.
Finally, the proposed model should enable the credit market to move from the
existing pooling equilibrium, in which debt is priced on the basis of the average
risk increase pursued by firms in a given risk category, to separating equilibria, in
which debt is priced on the basis of the firm's specific risk. In addition, because
parties could determine what scope the duty should have by contract, the model
would enable them to bargain for the most cost effective trade-off between an investment's level of risk and opportunity and monitoring costs. Hence, the proposed
model would allow parties to write debt contracts that maximize the ex ante value
of their exchange. From this perspective, any contractual interpretation not conforming to the letter of the parties' agreement would risk reducing the expected
value of their exchange by leading to a re-determination of the duty's scope, and
therefore of the parties' distribution of rights, by the third adjudicator. Also for this
reason, I argue that a textualist interpretative regime should be preferred over a
contextualist one.
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